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PUBLICITY NEVER DIES; IT JUST FADES
AWAY: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
David E. Shipleyt
It is economic reality that pecuniary value is inherent in
publicity.' Public figures often undertake endorsements, fran-
chise operations, and other business ventures because their names
will transfer goodwill to products and services.' The widespread
practice of purchasing rights to use an individual's name, likeness,
distinctive personality attributes, style, or characterizations to
promote a product or attract an audience is evidence that such
publicity interests have pecuniary value.'
Individuals have legitimate proprietary claims to their public-
ity interests.4 In many cases, the elements of a person's public
personality become valuable only after the investment of consider-
able time, effort, skill and perhaps money.5 People often want to
prevent the reproduction, promotion or other use of their public-
ity interests without authorization and remuneration.6 Since the
latter part of the nineteenth century, various courts have indi-
cated that publicity interests constitute a distinct kind of property
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.A. 1972, Oberlin Col-
lege; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago.
Copyright © 1981 by David E. Shipley.
' See, e.g., Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 215 (1954).
Some courts have taken judicial notice of the widespread commercial exploitation of
names, faces, and reputations of celebrities. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723,
729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2 One commentator has noted: "(]n recent years the values of certain famous names
have become inestimable. This needs no illustration when consideration is given to the
prices paid by companies for the use of a celebrity's name in conjunction with a product."
Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights in the Names, Likenesses or Personalities of Deceased Persons,
16 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17, 19 (1968).
- See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 215-16.
4 See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977); Rosemont Enterprises v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788,
790, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd and modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17
(Ist Dep't 1973).
' See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391-92, 400, 280
N.W.2d 129, 134-35, 138 (1979); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 215-16.
1 See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577, 1588-89 (1979); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 637, 641-48 (1973); Note, The Right of Publicity: A
Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1124 (1953).
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right.7  In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,8 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first expressly recognized
the right of publicity as an independent, enforceable property
right:9
We think that, in addition to and independent of the right of
privacy ... , a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made "in gross" ....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons ... would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for au-
thorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, dis-
played in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.
This right of publicity would usually yield them no money un-
See, e.g., Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 (1891); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1941) (dissenting opinion); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Uproar Co. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P.
544 (Ct. App. 1928); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Edison v. Edison
Polyform, Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Lawrence v. Ylla, 184 Misc. 807, 55
N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.,
155 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,
Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d
289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Contra, Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit do., 197 F. 982
(D. Mo. 1912); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 A.D. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951), aff'd,
304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 199 Misc. 38, 102
N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951), amended complaint dismissed, 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
8 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
' The plaintiff in Haelan contracted with a baseball player for the exclusive right to
use the player's name and photograph in promoting sales of the plaintiff's chewing gum.
The defendant, a competitor, secured the player's authorization to use his name and
photograph to advertise and sell its own gum. The plaintiff alleged tortious invasion of its
contract rights with the player. The defendant argued that an individual has no legal right
to control the publication of his picture, except in his right of privacy, which is a personal
and nonassignable right not to suffer emotional harm from such publication. Thus, the
contract between the player and the plaintiff, the defendant argued, was a release from
potential liability for invasion of privacy rather than a transfer of exclusive rights.
The court agreed that under existing right to privacy doctrina, the plaintiff's exclu-
sive-use contract released the plaintiff but did not constitute an assignment. Id. at 867. The
court nevertheless asserted that an individual has, in addition to the right of privacy, an
independent right to grant to another in gross the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture. Id. at 868. Whether such privilege is called a "property" right was immaterial, in
the court's view, because the label "property" simply means that courts enforce claims that
have pecuniary value. Id. The court held that if the defendant had used the player's photo-
graph with knowledge of the plaintiff's contract, the appropriation would have been
actionable. Id. at 869. See Note, State "Copyright" Protection for Performers: The First Amend-
ment Question, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1198, 1210-11 & n.65.
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less it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.'0
Haelan remains the seminal case in the development of the right
of publicity."
During the last fifteen years, the common law publicity right
has won increased judicial acceptance. 2  In 1977 it gained the
approval of the United States Supreme Court in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. Is Despite such judicial recogni-
tion, the definition of the right of publicity remains unclear; its
theory is still evolving and its limits are uncertain.'4
The state law doctrine of the right of publicity is analogous
to the tort of misappropriation in rationale, purpose, and scope.' 5
Similarly, the rationale for recognizing and protecting publicity
interests parallels the policy considerations that underlie the
federal copyright laws 16; the right itself is equivalent to copyright
in many respects.'7 Similarities between the right of publicity and
10 202 F.2d at 868.
1 See P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
134 (1973); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589. This Article uses the term "right of
publicity" to refer to any theory by which a plaintiff claims infringement of his exclusive
property right in his name, likeness, or aspects of his personality. See notes 34-50 and
accompanying text infra.
12 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589 & n.67. Numerous jurisdictions have recog-
nized the doctrine. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 827
(9th Cir. 1974) (California); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (Mis-
souri); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956) (Pennsylvania); Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1956) (New York); Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323
(W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-314 (Nov. 3,
1980); Uhlaender v. Hendrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
Hogan v. Barnes, 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.
1956); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979). But see,
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979);
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 356 F. Supp. 811 (D. Neb. 1973).
13 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The Court held that the plaintiff-entertainer's live human can-
nonball act was professional property under a state law based right of publicity and that a
television station consequently did not enjoy a first amendment privilege to report the act
in its entirety. Id. at 575-79. See Note, supra note 9, at 1210-11.
'4 Lack of clarity of definition and scope often attends judicial development of com-
mon law rights. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589-90.
"5 See note 74-86 and accompanying text infra.
I6 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977);
notes 63-70 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1601 (reach
of copyright law "limited, especially when asserted against the capabilities of modern
media").
" See notes 62-73 and accompanying text infra.
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such doctrines as copyright and misappropriation create uncer-
tainty about the continued vitality of the publicity doctrine in light
of the Copyright Act of 1976.8 Section 301(a) of the Act, which
defines the statute's preemptive effects on state law, provides that
interests that fall within the scope of federal copyright law may no
longer by protected by the common law or state statutes." The
sweeping language of section 301, the uncertain status of the mis-
appropriation doctrine under the 1976 Act,2" the conflict between
the arguably perpetual duration of the right of publicity and the
"limited times" provision of the Constitution's patent and copy-
right clause, 2' and the general federal policy on intellectual prQp-
erty suggest that in some situations the common law publicity
doctrine is subject to federal preemption.
This Article explores the nature and developing boundaries
of the state law doctrine of the right of publicity. It investigates
the doctrine's conflict with the 1976 Copyright Act and federal
policy concerning intellectual property, and concludes that the
1976 Act precludes publicity actions aimed at protecting certain
types of publicity interests. In other situations, the overriding
objectives of federal copyright policy preempt the right to the ex-
tent that the right is defined as perpetual; moreover, such protec-
tion in perpetuity violates the supremacy clause of the Federal
Constitution. Many types of publicity actions, however, should
escape preemption either because the asserted rights and interests
are outside the scope of the 1976 Act or because protection of the
particular rights and interests at stake comports with general
federal policy. To provide certainty regarding the publicity doc-
trine's scope and continued vitality, courts must construe state law
publicity rights in the context of the current federal copyright
law.
"s See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. I1 1979).
19 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979).
20 See generally A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 69 (5th ed. 1979); Fetter, Copyright
Revision and the Preemption of State "Misappropriation" Law: A Study in Judicial and Congression-
al Interaction, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 367 (1978); Comment, The Missappropriation Doc-
trine After the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REv. 469 (1978).
21 The Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONS'r. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (emphasis added).
Confusion in claim adjudication arises from the fact that although copyright protec-
tion is available for only a limited time, some courts have held that the right of publicity
survives in perpetuity the death of its owner. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979) (holding right of publicity transferable and perpetual if exploited by owner
[Vol. 66:673676
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I
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Nature and Scope
Broadly defined, the right of publicity is the right to own,
protect, and profit from the commercial value of an individual's
name, likeness, activities, and identity." The notion that property
rights adhere to the pecuniary value of a name and personal fea-
tures has long received judicial recognition.3 In 1891, the Su-
preme Court observed that "[a] man's name is his own property,
and he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to
that of any other species of property."24  If an individual has
worked to develop in his name and likeness sufficient value to
excite the desire of another to market them, then that person
arguably deserves property rights in the interests" and entitle-
ment to control their resulting profitability. Courts, accordingly,
have protected the interests from unauthorized use. 6
during his lifetime); Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323
(W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 80-314 (Nov. 3, 1980).
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38-39 (1977), aff'd, 25
Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
22 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Felcher &
Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589; Rader, The "Right of Publicity"-A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 228 (1979).
' See Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L.
REv. 553 (1960). Numerous courts, interpreting interests in pecuniary value of names and
personal features as protectible under the right of privacy, have obscured the distinctive
nature of such interests. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting judicial confusion). In general, litigation of claims contesting the
appropriation of names, likenesses, and personalities has arisen under various legal
theories. Claimants most frequently have alleged invasion of the right of privacy. See Gor-
don, supra, at 554; Note, supra note 9, at 1210 n.65; notes 27-29 and accompanying text
infra. For a thorough, well-documented discussion of the general confusion in this area, see
Gordon, supra. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified, 139 Cal.
3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (holding right of publicity part of right of
privacy).
24 Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 542, 544 (1891). See also Minton v. Smith, 276
Ill. App. 128 (1934); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 141, 67 A. 392,
394 (1907).
' Cf. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 659, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (1911) (suggest-
ing physical appearance alone sometimes sufficient to support assertion of property right).
I In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979), the
court stated that because "the primary advertising value of a celebrity's personality was
created through the work and sacrifice of the celebrity, that value could constitute an
interest that the law should protect." Id. at 391, 280 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting Treece, supra
note 6, at 646-47 (footnote omitted)). Recent decisions have held that the interest in the
publicity value of one's name or likeness is a valid property right that is transferable and
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The right of privacy was often successfully asserted to pro-
tect publicity interests .2  The decisions that established the com-
mon law right of privacy uniformly recognized that an individual
has property rights in his name and likeness, 8 and that the
appropriation of some element of a public personality constituted
an actionable invasion of that right.29 As a result, the appropria-
tion tort became recognized as one of four types of privacy
actions.2 0 With the development of modern advertising and mer-
chandising techniques, publicity interests assumed increased
pecuniary value. Although the right of privacy entitled plaintiffs
to seek injunctive relief or damages, it provided inadequate pro-
tection because recovery was subject to the uncertainty of courts
having to measure injury to feelings or emotions.31 Thus, it
appeared that adequate protection of publicity rights required a
publicity right distinct from the right of privacy, the unfair com-
petition doctrine, 32 and other theories in contract and defa-
mation.3
perpetual if exploited by the owner during his lifetime. See note 21 and accompanying text
supra. The term "exploitation," however, has evaded definition. See Hicks v. Casablanca
Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); accord, Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1975), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603
P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
27 Cf. Gordon, supra note 23, at 558, 611-12 (discussing legal protection of interests
from commercial exploitation of names and likenesses in context of development of right
of privacy). Most early cases concerned the use of a name or likeness in advertisings where
the principal injury from the appropriation was humiliation and mental anguish rather
than damages or unjust enrichment. Cf. Nimmer, supra note I, at 216-17 (comparing and
distinguishing right of privacy and right of publicity).
28 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 23, at 560.
9 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
Dean Leon Green argued for classifying right of privacy cases according to the type of
harm involved. See Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237, 239 (1932). See also
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 213-16, 50 S.E. 68, 78-79 (1905)
(citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 557, 561-66, 64 N.E. 442,
450 (1902) (Gray, J., dissenting) (describing as a property right the interest in protection
against unauthorized commercial use of a person's likeness)); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
"o See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 804-14. The appropriation tort is distinct from
intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing pri-
vate facts about the plaintiff, or publicity giving the plaintiff a false public image. Id. at
807, 809, 812. See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
-1 See Note, supra note 6, at 1124. The threat of lawsuit may have compelled appro-
priators to pay for the use of names or pictures in some cases.
22 See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544, 546 (1928) (held plaintiff entitled to injunc-
tive relief against imitator because of right to protection against unfair competition in busi-
ness).
22 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 204-10.
678
1981] PUBLICITY PREEMPTION 679
After the Second Circuit in Haelans first acknowledged such
a distinct right, several jurisdictions followed.15  These courts re-
garded the right of publicity as an intangible property right that
is assignable, transferable," and, in some jurisdictions, devisable. 7
Unlike the right of privacy, which plaintiffs invoked in this con-
text to compensate injured feelings, 8 the right of publicity ex-
pressly protects an individual's right to reap financial rewards
from his endeavors. 9
In general, invasions of the right of publicity involve inciden-
tal use by the press of a person's name or picture,40 or unautho-
1 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
-1 See note 12 supra. See also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 71, 78 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S,D.N.Y.
1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Chaplin v. National
Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Supreme Court expressly recognized the dis-
tinction between the right of publicity and the right of privacy. See note 13 and accom-
panying text supra.
m See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't
1977).
"' See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979) (holding right of publicity inheritable). See generally Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 6, at 1588-90; Rader, supra note 24, at 29; Comment, Transfer of the Right of
Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1103-04 (1975).
Courts had long recognized legal interests similar to the right of publicity, such as an
assignable interest in the commercial value of personality. See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.,
255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (lst Dep't 1938); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton,
238 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). But see Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935).
-1 See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 390-91, 403, 280 N.W.2d
129, 134, 140 (1979). See also Gordon, supra note 23, at 558, 611-12; Nimmer, supra note 1,
at 216; Treece, supra note 6, at 648-52.
" See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). Allow-
ing free use of some aspect of an individual's persona, which has a recognized value and
which normally entitles the owner to compensation, would serve no social purpose. See id.
at 576 (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PRoB. 326, 331 (1965)). Under the right of publicity, damages for violations may
match the plaintiff's actual pecuniary losses and lead to injunctive relief as well. Economic
damages recoverable under the right may include compensation for damage to reputation
if, for example, the value of the plaintiff's name has been diluted by its unauthorized use
in advertisements. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391, 280
N.W.2d 129, 138 (1979); Treece, supra note 6, at 641-43. See generally notes 51-61 and
accompanying text infra.
40 See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (discussed at note 9 supra). The court in Haelan did not
address the question of whether the right of publicity protects only the fame of celebrities.
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rized use of a name or likeness for commercial purposes. Thus,
an individual may recover damages for breach of the right of
publicity when a manufacturer uses the individual's reputation to
enhance the attractiveness of a product, or appropriates the activ-
ity by which he first acquired his reputation.4' Courts have pro-
tected several interests under the right of publicity,42 including the
plaintiff's name,43 his nickname, 44 his likeness, 4 a character that he
has created,4" his performance,4 7 his distinctive style,4" and mate-
rials closely associated with his personality. 49 Despite this judicial
If the right is so limited, then its protection is incomplete. See generally Nimmer, supra note
1, at 215-16; Treece, supra note 6, at 652; Note, supra note 6, at 1128-30.
, See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (discus-
sed at note 13 and accompanying text supra, and at notes 190-97 and accompanying text
infra). See also note 39 supra.
41 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 1105 & n.18.
41 See, e.g., Haelan Laboratorties, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970); Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
4 See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979)
("Crazylegs").
41 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Protection extends to interests in photographed likenesses, see Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367
F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting, in denial of cross motions for summary judgment,
possibility of recovery against magazine that published article on fashions which included
photograph of plaintiff's head on torso of model), and imitations of likenesses, see Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting injunction against unauthorized
printing, publication and distribution of obscene portrait clearly recognizable as that of
former heavyweight boxing champion).
46 See, e.g., Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979) (granting injunctive relief against production of televi-
sion series in which actors portrayed Laurel and Hardy characters).
47 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding
damages recoverable for unauthorized taped news broadcast of plaintiff's live perform-
ance).
4' See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1962) (sustaining action
against imitation of popular actor's voice in advertisements); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal.
App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928) (finding likelihood of public deception sufficient grounds for
injunctive relief against unauthorized use of performer's voice, mannerisms, gestures and
dress); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d
Dep't 1977) (granting relief against advertising agency's automobile commercial depicting
plaintiff conducting band at New Year's Eve party); Sim v. H.J. Heinz Co., [1959] 1 All
E.R. 547 (C.A.). Entertainers who have a unique and well-known "style" are often unsuc-
cessful in obtaining relief against imitators, in part because of the difficulty of defining
what is and is not "style." See Note, Intellectual Property-Performer's Style-A Quest for Ascer-
tainment, Recognition and Protection, 52 DFN. L.J. 561 (1975).
19 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
(vacating summary judgment for defendant where defendant's advertisement depicted
plaintiff race-car driver's likeness in manner recognizable on account of distinctive car de-
corations).
recognition of the right of publicity, however, considerable uncer-
tainty remains concerning the doctrine's definition and scope of
protection. °
B. Rationale for Protection
Protecting the right of publicity provides incentive for per-
formers to make the economic investments required to produce
performances appealing to the public."' The rationale for patent
and copyright protection is analogous: 52
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days de-
voted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
with the services rendered. 3
The Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.54
emphasized that the economic value of the plaintiff's human can-
nonball act depended upon his exclusive control of its publicity. If
the plaintiff lost his exclusive control and the public could watch
the act on television, the Court reasoned, the public might be less
willing to pay to see it at a county fair.5 5  The Court added that
protecting such individual economic interests would promote the
public's interest in access to entertainment.56
50 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589-90. Arguably, debate about whether the
right of publicity protects a property interest is pointless. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 30, at
406. As one commentator has noted, the consequences of recognizing legal publicity in-
terests are practical: "Once protected by the law, [the right of a person to the use of his
name and likeness] . . . is a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling
licenses." W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 807.
'I See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
52 Id. at 573. The purpose of the right of publicity overlaps the purpose of the patent
and copyright laws in that its protection provides an economic incentive for individuals to
create and perform. This promotes the public interest in access to entertainment and other
forms of expression. Cf. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case
of Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200, 205-06 (1978) (arguing that encouragement of
authors' and inventors' efforts by promise of personal gain best enhances public welfare).
51 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
51 Id. at 575. The Court acknowledged that by increasing the value of the plaintiff's
performance, the defendant's broadcast might have precluded his proving damages.
Nevertheless, because the plaintiff alleged that the broadcast had caused him injury of
$25,000, the Court upheld the state's power to award compensation for the alleged injuries
if proven. Id. at 575 n.12.
m Id. at 576.
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More frequently, litigated publicity actions involve names,
likenesses, style, and personality attributes. The rationale for pro-
tecting such interests parallels the interest in protecting publicity
rights in performances. 57  Unauthorized use of a recognized pub-
licity interest threatens its continued pecuniary value. 8 A per-
son's name, likeness, character, style, or reputation becomes
valuable because of an investment of skill, effort, energy, and
expense. Maintaining the value of such attributes requires the right
to exercise exclusive control over their use. Misappropriation of
publicity interests to enhance product marketing, for example,
could harm the individual, by making his authorized endorse-
ments less valuable, diluting the good will and pecuniary value of
his name, and perhaps even injuring his credibility. 9 Protecting
these interests from misappropriation prevents unjust
enrichment. 0 In addition, protection provides an economic in-
centive to make the investment necessary to win audience appeal
or gain prominence in a particular field. This in turn promotes
public entertainment and other socially beneficial enterprises.6'
C. Similarity to Copyright
The right of publicity resembles copyright in many respects.
Both doctrines are "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforce-
able rights""6 in order to afford greater encouragement to the
V See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 339 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the
Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128, 1129-32
(1980); Note, supra note 9, at 1214-15.
5 See, e.g., Treece, supra note 6, at 642-43.
-" One commentator has noted that "(aludience appeal is a principal stock-in-trade of a
celebrity. The celebrity creates audience appeal not only through the substantive achieve-
ments that bring him fame, but at the expense of the privacy that he must surrender in
becoming a public personality." Treece, supra note 6, at 646. An advertiser's misappropria-
tion of the celebrity's public image may damage his audience appeal. Resulting harm to the
individual, moreover, is greater if the advertised product is a shoddy one.
60 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
The right to protect publicity values is analogous to a business's right to profit from the
goodwill in its name. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally Grimes &
Battersby, The Protection of Merchandisimg Properties, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 431 (1979).
"' See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 829, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 339 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57, at
1128-32; notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
11 Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). One commentator
has written that "[t]he purpose of copyright is to attract private investment to the produc-
tion of original expression. Property is the inducement offered, in the form of rights in the
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production of works beneficial to the public.6 Copyright protects
valuable achievements of authors, composers, and artists; 6 simi-
larly, the right of publicity protects a person's rights in the value
of his skills, craft, or talents. 65  As with copyright, protection
against the appropriation of publicity interests typically does not
require any likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. 66  Courts
in several jursidictions have held that the right of publicity sur-
vives the death of its owner, like copyright.6 ' Further, it extends
to the individual's form of expression, but not to the idea under-
lying that expression. Originality, a prerequisite for copyright,
is also a prerequisite to the creation of a valuable right of
expression created." Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1107, 1107 (1977). Similarly, the
right of publicity-a property right in the "persona" or expression that an individual
creates-attracts investment and rewards the production of expression. Cf. Note, supra
note 9, at 1222 (discussing overlapping policies of copyright and right of publicity, and
constitutional limits on both rights arising from first amendment).
6 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
The Court concluded that in view of the similar objectives of copyright and the right of
publicity, the Constitution does not prohibit states from choosing to protect an entertain-
er's incentive in order to encourage the production of creative work. Id. (citing Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), and Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
See notes 102-10 and accompanying text infra. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.
3d 813, 839, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 339 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
" See A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 1. Until recently, the term "copyright" was distin-
guished from the common law right to control first publication of literary property. The
term connotes a congressional statutory grant of a qualified monopoly for a limited time to
encourage the production and dissemination of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
works. See note 21 supra. Copyrights are not granted by any government agency. Rather,
they arise from acts of the authors, who thereafter register their claims. Eligible works
need not be novel, nor must they rise to the level of invention; they only have to be
original-created without copying. See A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 1.
' In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 55, modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37
(1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), the Court empha-
sized the doctrinal overlap in this area:
The tie-up of one's name, face and/or likeness with a business, product or serv-
ice creates a tangible and saleable product in much the same way as property
may be created by one who organizes under his name a business to build and/
or sell houses according to a fixed plan or who writes a book, paints a picture or
creates an invention.
139 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (emphasis added).
See notes 319-24 and accompanying text infra.
67 See Laff & Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel and
Hardy, 7 Lov. CHi. L.J. 33, 55 (1975).
6" Copyright does not restrain the use of an idea or concept. See United States v.
Bodin, 374 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1180 (1970). Similarly,
the Zacchini decision indicates that the right of publicity does not extend to ideas. Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (plaintiff's right of
publicity would not prevent defendant television station from staging or filming its own
human cannonball act).
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publicity.69 Each right allows its holder to monopolize the
copying and use of original expression; such control encourages
creative expression.
The doctrines are not, however, identical. Copyright protec-
tion is not available unless the author's expression of his idea is
fixed in a tangible form,70 whereas the availability of protection
under the right of publicity does not necessarily require the indi-
vidual to create anything tangible. The interest created under the
right of publicity is the person's individual style-his persona-
which need not become tangibly fixed in a medium of expression.
More important, although copyright protection is available for a
limited time, in some jurisdictions the right of publicity is perpet-
ual, lasting as long as the public recognizes the person's name,
likeness, or attributes of his personality.' In this sense, the right
resembles a trademark; the value of a trademark, and its con-
tinuing protectability, derive from public recognition.7 2  Notwith-
standing these differences, the right of publicity closely resembles
copyright and, at least arguably, falls within copyright doctrine.3
D. Similarity to Misappropriation
The right of publicity is likewise analogous to the tort doc-
trine of misappropriation. 74  The seminal case in the development
of the tort of misappropriation is International News Service v.
Associated Press.75 Because International News Service (INS) did
not have access to the cables that wired news of World War I
from Europe to America, it copied the news from Associated
Press's (AP) bulletin boards and from AP's member newspapers
on the east coast and wired the material to clients on the west
69 See Brenner, What's in a Name and Who Owns It?, 6 BARRIST'ER 42, 46 (Winter 1979).
70 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. III 1979).
71 See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 55; notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 55.
7 Cf. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57, at 1129-32 (emphasizing that right of publicity
doctrine is closely analogous to copyright doctrine). Contra, Brenner, supra note 69. When
certain kinds of publicity interests become fixed in a tangible medium of expression the
analogy to copyright is even stronger. See notes 249-54 and accompanying text infra,
" See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The
right of publicity, which the Court in Zacchini described as "strong," id. at 576, is almost
indistinguishable from the tort of misappropriation. In a different jurisdiction, the "human
cannonball" plaintiff in Zacchini might have alleged misappropriation. Diamond, Preemption
of State Law, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 204, 211 n.44 (1977).
7 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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coast who competed with AP's members. The Supreme Court
held this redistribution of plaintiff's news dispatches actionable.16
The Court observed that the rule limiting equity courts to
protection of property rights "treats any civil right of a pecuniary
nature as a property right ... and the right to acquire property
by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much
entitled to protection as the right to guard property already
acquired."77  INS, the Court emphasized, had taken marketable
material that AP obtained through its considerable investment
and had, "in appropriating it and selling it as its own ...
endeavor[ed] to reap where it ha[d] not sown."78  Such miscon-
duct, the Court held, justified the plaintiff's action for damages. 79
State and federal courts upholding misappropriation claims
often stress the INS Court's emphasis on unjust enrichment. They
cite INS as authority for the proposition that the law of unfair
competition rests on the broad principle that "property rights of
commercial value are to be and will be protected from any form
of unfair invasion or infringement and from any form of com-
mercial immorality, and a court of equity will penetrate and
restrain every guise resorted to by the wrong-doer." 0  The mis-
appropriation doctrine has evolved into an independent prohibi-
tion on poaching off of another's investment, without regard to
defenses available under passing-off or unfair competition
theories.8' Enabling states to prevent copying where statutory
copyright laws would not, 2 the doctrine recognizes that indi-
viduals and commercial enterprises have enforceable proprietary
7 Id. at 231. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHr 86 (1967). The INS
Court recognized a viable cause of action for misappropriation-the conversion of the
investment, labor or skill of another for use as one's own. 248 U.S. at 236. The case did
not concern copyright because the protection sought was not for the copyrightable expres-
sion of the news in the dispatches, but for the news itself, which was not copyrightable. Id.
at 234. The Court assumed "that neither party ha[d] any remaining property interest as
against the public in uncopyrighted news matter." Id. at 236. Nevertheless, in the Court's
view it did not follow that there was no remaining property interest in the news as between
the parties. Id.
77 Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
78 Id. at 239-40. The Court indicated that a court of equity would characterize the
misconduct as unfair competition. Id. at 240.
7' The Court held that equity afforded relief for the claim of unfair competition. Id. at
240.
'o Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632 (1st Dep't 1951).
S" Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1116; Comment, supra note 20, at 479-80.
" Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1116. Courts have made relief against misappropriation
"a right, like copyright, valid as against the whole world." Goldstein, Federal System Ordering
of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 58 (1969).
6851981]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
interests in trade values they create and that invasion of these
values occurs when an unauthorized person converts them for
personal use and profit. 3
The rationale used in INS to protect the news gathering
efforts of the Associated Press closely resembles the rationale for
protecting the right of publicity."4 Indeed, the Court's theory of
unjust enrichment and unfair competition formed the foundation
from which courts developed the right of publicity.s5 Under both
the misappropriation doctrine and the right of publicity, an indi-
vidual with publicity interests may seek protection from unautho-
rized use or appropriation by predatory practices.
Distinctions between conduct actionable under a misappro-
priation theory and actions giving rise to the prototypical right of
publicity action are trivial. Unjust enrichment through the conver-
sion of hard-earned and valuable intangible interests constitutes
the remediable wrong in both situations. In either case, the plain-
tiff seeks damages or injunctive relief against the defendant mak-
ing free use of his publicity interests. The right of publicity, like
misappropriation, can be seen as providing an independent rule,
distinct from passing-off or unfair competition, which protects an
individual who has invested resources to develop his name, like-
ness and persona.
II
PREEMPTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY BEFORE 1978
The preemption doctrine, derived from the Constitution's
supremacy clause,85 nullifies a state statute or common law that
frustrates objectives underlying an act of Congress.8 7 Federal leg-
islation preempts state law when "either ... the nature of the reg-
ulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or ... the Con-
gress has unmistakably so ordained." 88 Because the Constitution
s' See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Com-
ment, supra note 20, at 469 n.2.
1 Because INS was decided as a matter of federal common law, the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), may have diminished its stare decisis impact in the
federal courts. See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 35.
5 Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 35-36. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
8 The supremacy clause states that "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoN5r. art. VI, cl. 2.
'7 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
[Vol. 66:673
PUBLICITY PREEMPTION
granted Congress the power to establish patent and copyright
laws,89 state regulation of some kinds of intellectual property may
unconstitutionally conflict with federal copyright law90 and patent
legislation.9'
Before examining the preemptive effect of the 1976 Copy-
right Act,92 which took effect in 1978, it is instructive to review
cases that arose under the old copyright law, and that involved
the right of publicity and analogous causes of action. Few courts
have construed the preemption provisions of the 1976 Act, and
older decisions may presage the difficulties courts will confront
when determining the continued vitality of the right of publicity.
A. Federal Preemption and Intellectual Property Policy
Since 1964, the Supreme Court has decided six cases involv-
ing alleged federal preemption of state law affecting intellectual
property. In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,9" and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,9 4 the lower courts had held that the
copying of unpatentable industrial designs violated state unfair
competition laws. 9 The Supreme Court reversed both decisions.
The Court held in Compco that the state law remedies conflicted
with "the federal policy ... of allowing free access to copy what-
ever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain."9 In Sears, the Court more broadly stated, "[B]ecause
of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is
unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article
itself or award damages for such copying."97
Although these decisions suggest that states ought not to en-
force their laws against unfair competition in a manner that
would conflict even indirectly with the objectives of federal copy-
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See note 21 supra.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (Supp. III 1979).
' See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1977). See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); B.
KAPLAN, supra note 76, at 92.
9 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979).
93 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
9 Id. at 234.
91 See 376 U.S. at 225-27, 234-35.
1 376 U.S. at 237.
376 U.S. at 232. The Court similarly stated in Compco that "when an article is unpro-
tected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article." Id.
at 237. See Comment, supra note 20, at 480.
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right and patent laws," the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins"
suggested a narrower scope of federal preemption.' In Lear,
Justice Harlan recognized in dicta a state's power to enforce a
promise to pay royalities for the use of an unpatentable invention
while the patent application was pending.'' The Court thus im-
plied that some state-created rights might be sufficiently compel-
ling to justify their disruptive impact on federal intellectual prop-
erty policy.10 2
The Court subsequently clarified the Lear dictum in Goldstein
v. California,' holding that the constitutional grant of copyright
power to Congress was not exclusive. The defendant had argued
that the federal Copyright Act of 1909, which excluded sound
recordings from its coverage, preempted state protection of such
"writings." 104 The Court, however, upheld the constitutionality of
a state law that made pirating sound recordings a criminal
offense. 5 The Court determined that the legislative history of
the Copyright Act of 1909 reflected no congressional intent to
foreclose state regulation of a category of writings unregulated by
Congress, so long as that regulation did not interfere with federal
copyright policy.' 0 The Goldstein decision thus permitted states to
9 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 231, 234 (1964). The actual
holdings in Sears and Compco arguably were narrow. Both cases involved subject matter that
was unpatentable only because it lacked "novelty." Novelty, however, is not prerequisite for
copyright. This may suggest that the Court's holding on preemption specifically applies
only to federal regulation of patents, not copyright. Moreover, in each case the lower
court's injunctive relief was based on findings that consumers were likely to be confused as
to the manufacturer of the items. The Supreme Court concluded in Compco that antici-
pated consumer confusion was best remedied by labeling rather than an injunction forbid-
ding all sales. 376 U.S. at 238-39. Judicial inquiry into likelihood of confusion is not typical
in cases of copyright infringement.
Broader interpretation of Sears and Compco is, however, possible because the federal
interests in controlling patents and copyright are so similar that the rationales of Sears and
Compco apply equally to copyright even though neither case involved copyright questions
directly.
- 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
100 One commentator has argued that Sears and Compco deprived states of the power to
apply the passing-off doctrine. Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free
Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1195 (1975). The decisions significantly influ-
enced lower courts. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d
348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom., 379 U.S. 989 (1965); Herald Publishing Co. v.
Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So.2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
101 395 U.S. at 674-75.
102 See Katz, supra note 52, at 209.
10- 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
1o4 Id. at 566.
101 Id. at 570-71. See also 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHr § 1.01[A], at 1-3 to 1-6 (1979).
'0 412 U.S. at 564-69. Contra, THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 U. Cook ed. 1964) U.
Madison). Advocating federal authority to regulate patents and copyrights, Madison stated,
"The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of these cases." Id.
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afford copyright protection to published "writings" that did not
fall within the scope of the federal copyright law.' °7 Further, the
Court held that states retained concurrent power to protect some
works of authorship that were within the scope of the Copyright
Act if such protection did not conflict with the federal law. 08
In later cases, the Court further delineated this latitude for
state regulation. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,' 9 the Court
held that federal patent law did not preempt a cause of action
under Ohio's state trade secret law."" Although the misappropri-
ated secret in the case was an unpatentable process, the Court
noted that uncontrolled disclosure of the process would not
appreciably benefit the public."' The Court made clear that state
law would not be preempted merely because it related to intellec-
tual property."' Rather, states could regulate the use of intellec-
tual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.",
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,"' the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether federal patent law preempted a state law that
allowed enforcement of an agreement to pay royalties on sales of
articles embodying an invention for which a patent, though
sought, was unissued."' The court of appeals had found that the
state law contravened "the strong federal policy favoring the full
and free use of ideas in the public domain" and was thus
preempted." 6 The Supreme Court reversed. It noted that com-
mercial transactions traditionally are regulated under state law" 7
and that enforcement of the royalty agreement would not conflict
with the aims of the patent system.""
'07 Comment, supra note 20, at 481. The Goldstein Court predicted that "a conflict would
develop if a state attempted to protect that which Congress intended to be free from
restraint or to free that which Congress had protected." 412 U.S. at 559.
10' See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[A], at 1-3. Nimmer notes that there was
widespread acceptance of the view that the states retained residual concurrent powers to
regulate copyright, subject to the primacy of federal law. Id.
109 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
1o Id. at 479. The Court predicted that protection of the rights under state law would
not lead to disregard of the federal patent system. Id. at 483-93.
"I Id. at 482-83.
1.2 In summarizing the Goldstein decision, the Court stated that "at least in the case of
writings, the states were not prohibited from encouraging and protecting the efforts of
those within their borders by appropriate legislation." Id. at 478-79.
"I Id. at 479.
', 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
"1 Id. at 258-59. The contract obligations did not depend upon the issuance of a patent.
Id. at 260-61.
116 Id. at 261 (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969)).
117 Id. at 262.
"8 Id. at 262-63. The Court also noted that Sears and Compco did not require a contrary
result because enforcement of the contract would not prevent others from copying the
device. Id. at 264.
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The Lear, Goldstein, Kewanee, and Aronson decisions reflected
the Court's view that state and federal regulation of intellectual
property is concurrent."9 The cases established that federal con-
trols do not displace state statutory or common law protection
merely because it relates to intellectual property potentially eligi-
ble for federal patent or copyright. State regulation of intellectual
property is preempted only when it conflicts with the objectives of
federal law. 2 '
In the area of copyright law, for example, no court has ever
determined that the Constitution's copyright clause, by its own
force, precluded all state laws affecting copyright. 2' From 1834,
when the Supreme Court upheld the validity of common law
copyright, 2 until the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976,12
state common law copyright protected unpublished works and
federal statutory copyright protected published works. 24
B. Preemption of Analogous Rights
Following the Supreme Court's strong emphasis in Sears and
Compco on the primacy of federal copyright policies, the state law
misappropriation doctrine seemed to be a prime candidate for
preemption. 2 Judge Learned Hand long before had argued, in
Cheny Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp.,'26 that the INS Court, "for
reasons of justice," had recognized a kind of "common law patent
or copyright." 127 Hand contended, however, that in general, pro-
viding relief for misappropriation was the responsibility of legisla-
tures, not courts.'28 He later argued that if a person's work is a
"writing," the copyright clause of the Constitution forces its owner
to choose between a "limited" use that does not constitute publica-
"' See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[A], at 1-6.
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
121 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[A], at 1-3; Katz, supra note 52, at 206.
SWheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
' Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)). The 1976 Act became effective Jan. 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1977).
114 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[A], at 103.
'25 See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 50.
126 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
127 Id. at 280.
128 Id. at 281. Judge Hand's disapproval of the INS doctrine is evident in several later
opinions. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955) (L. Hand, J., dissenting); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d
Cir. 1952); National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publication, Inc., 191 F.2d 594,
603 (2d Cir. 1951); Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80,
83-84 (2d Cir. 1940).
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tion, or unrestricted dedication of the work to the public.' 29  A
contrary policy, Hand insisted, would permit states to confer per-
petual protection upon works and thus "defeat the overriding
purpose of the [Copyright] Clause, which was to grant only for
'limited Times' the untrammelled exploitation of an author's
'Writings.' " 130
The First Circuit adopted Judge Hand's broad preemption
theory I in its first decision in Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v.
DeCosta (DeCosta 1).32 In DeCosta I, the court held that the plain-
tiff had no right to the exclusive use of a performance name and
denied recovery for the unauthorized use of his character
concept.'3 The court broadly interpreted Sears and Compco to
require that any creation, whether or not protectible under fed-
eral law, must comply with the requirements of the Copyright Act
to avoid falling into the public domain.34 The court concluded
that the strong emphasis in both cases on the predominance of
federal interests effectively overruled INS. 5 The court asserted
that the federal policy favoring free dissemination of intellectual
creations controlled, and that protection against copying would
not extend to a character that, in the court's view, was "so slight a
12 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (L.
Hand, J., dissenting).
130 Id. Hand cited the need for uniformity as another justification for preemption. Id.
Is' See generally Comment, supra note 20, at 478-79 (discussing Hand's constitutional
preemption argument).
132 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1968).
I' Plaintiff Victor DeCosta had created in himself a performing character that had a
moustache and wore an all-black cowboy outfit with a St. Mary's medal attached to his hat.
Adopting the name "Paladin," he participated as a spirited horse-rider and quick-draw
artist cowboy in parades, rodeos, and fairs in southeastern New England. His popularity
grew and over the years he made many public appearances. He distributed about 250,000
business cards bearing the symbol of a chess knight and the inscriptions "Have Gun Will
Travel" and "Wire Paladin, N. Court Street, Cranston, R.I." Selling no product or service
and charging no fee, DeCosta made appearances that were later viewed as among "the
purest promotions ever staged." 377 F.2d at 316.
DeCosta's publicity interests included his created name, Paladin, his calling cards, and
his likeness-the hat, moustache, medallion and the all-black outfit-as well as his distinc-
tive performance. Ten years after creating his character, he viewed the first CBS television
production of "Have Gun Will Travel." Similarities between television's "Paladin" and the
plaintiff's created character were striking. In his action invoking a misappropriation theory
against the television network, the defendant's program writers testified that the series was
an independent creation. The trial court, however, held for plaintiff on a theory of mis-
appropriation of plaintiff's idea and character. Id. at 317.
1 4 The court stated that "if a 'writing' is within the scope of the constitutional clause,
and Congress has not protected it, whether deliberately or by unexplained omission, it can
be freely copied." Id. at 319. See also Comment, Copyright Pre-emption and Character Values:
The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1968).
- 377 F.2d at 320.
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thing as not to warrant protection by any law." 6 The court de-
clared that a character that was "ineffable," and therefore ineligi-
ble for copyright protection, was also ineligible for any other pro-
tection, state or federal.17  Further, because the plaintiff's calling
cards-writings within the meaning of the Copyright Act-had
not been published with the requisite notice, they were in the
public domain.3 8
Although the plaintiff in DeCosta I had sought recovery on
the theory of willful misappropriation of idea and character,' the
asserted right in DeCosta I resembled the right of publicity. "
DeCosta created a character in himself named Paladin. DeCosta's
own distinguishing features-a moustache, medallion on his hat,
black outfit and calling cards-were the elements of both the cre-
ated character and the performed act. He claimed that CBS had
appropriated all of his character's attributes without his consent.
These facts would support the assertion of a right of publicity
claim; the plaintiff alleged that CBS appropriated the very name
and character by which this entertainer acquired his repu-
tation.' However, the court's rationale for concluding that the
misappropriation claim was preempted applies by analogy to im-
ply preemption of a right of publicity claim.
The Supreme Court's decision in Goldstein v. California 4 2 re-
pudiated the expansive constitutional preemption theory followed
in the first DeCosta case. "3 In DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting
System (DeCosta i/),' decided six years after DeCosta I,'4 the First
Circuit considered the two remaining counts of the plaintiff's
136 Id.
137 Id.
"' Id. at 321.
"' Counts two and three of the complaint asserted willful and intentional infringement
of the plaintiff's common law trademark and/or service marks, and unfair competition
(passing-off). DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See note 73-86 and accompanying text supra.
'1 See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 55 n.84.
" Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding televi-
sion station's broadcast of plaintiff's entire live "human cannonball" act violative of rights
of publicity). The "Paladin" character, including its several accouterments, enhanced the
attractiveness of the defendant's commercial product-a new television series. See also
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 838-31, 603 P.2d 425, 444-45, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 332-35 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
142 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
M The Court stated that "[u]nder the Constitution, the States have not relinquished all
power to grant to authors 'the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.' " Id. at 560. See
Diamond, supra note 74, at 211.
'4 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975).
143 See notes 132-38 and accompanying text supra.
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original complaint, along with a challenge to the exercise of juris-
diction by a magistrate who had been appointed to decide the
first count by a district court. 4 6  The two counts in issue con-
cerned alleged common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 7
The court acknowledged that Goldstein mandated a retreat
from its earlier expansive reading of Sears and Compco, which had
precluded state protection of writings not covered by the Copy-
right Act.4 8  Accepting the trial court's finding that "at least
among some people, plaintiff's name and card had come to be
associated with him," 49 the First Circuit viewed the central issue
as whether the lower court's finding of likelihood of confusion
was clearly erroneous.' Noting "that plaintiff has lost something
of value to him" and that "the very success of the defendant's
series saturated the public consciousness and in time diluted the
attractiveness of plaintiff's creation," . the court nevertheless
found that several factors precluded a finding of likelihood of
confusion. 2  The loss, therefore, could not be protected under
several related state common law theories.53
'16 See id. at 502.
"' The plaintiff alleged that this "Have Gun Will Travel" slogan, along with the figure
of a chess knight and the words "Wire Paladin" on his calling cards, constituted common
law service marks. The defendant's appropriation allegedly infringed the service marks
and thus damaged the plaintiff by detracting from his goodwill. DeCosta also alleged that
CBS copied his marks and manner of dress, and then passed off the character as original.
CBS thus diluted his goodwill and thereby unjustly profited. Id. at 509.
'I Id. at 510. The court's 1967 interpretation had precluded any state sanction, whether
based on service mark infringement or unfair competition, that prohibited copying permit-
ted under federal law. Id. See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 44. One commentator has
thus argued that the Court acknowledged in DeCosta II that it had erred by allowing Sears
and Compco to influence its interpretation in DeCosta I. Diamond, supra note 74, at 211.
'19 520 F.2d at 513. The court recognized that Sears and Compco permitted state protec-
tion of marks, labels and trade dress. Id. at 509-11. In the case it assumed the existence in
the case of valid common law service marks that were distinctive or, alternatively, that had
acquired secondary meaning. Id. at 511-12.
"50 Id. at 514. See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 45.
"' 520 F.2d at 515.
'5 Id. at 514-15. The court used the defense of laches, based on the plaintiff's eleven
year delay in filing suit, as justification for increasing the burden on the plaintiff to prove
likelihood of confusion. It reasoned that a lack of public deception after a substantial lapse
of time supports the defense that the allegedly infringing use created no likelihood of
confusion. Id. The plaintiff failed to carry this heavier burden of proving likelihood of
confusion. The virtually identical nature of the marks was insufficient. Extrinsic differ-
ences, such as the gross disparity in the size of the parties' audiences, the difference in type
of "customers" or channels of trade, along with the plaintiff's haphazard manner of per-
formance, precluded a finding of likehood of confusion. Id. See Laff & Saret, supra note
67, at 45.
"s Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 45.
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The two DeCosta decisions establish that the mere copying of
a distinctive character, service mark, or style of appearance or
dress is insufficient to establish liability in the absence of copy-
right protection or a clear showing of likelihood of confusion. 54
Despite the DeCosta plaintiff's acknowledged loss, and despite the
fact that CBS used his publicity interests to create a successful
television series,' the court denied recovery in each case. The
similarity between DeCosta's unsuccessful assertions and the right
of publicity suggests that a publicity theory claim also would have
failed either on preemption grounds or because of plaintiff's in-
ability to prove likelihood of confusion.
In Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,' 5" the Ninth Circuit
similarly denied protection to an interest in publicity rights.'57
Nancy Sinatra brought an unfair competition action against an
advertiser whose television commercials adopted the music and
revised lyrics of a song that she had made popular, "These Boots
Are Made For Walkin'." Although the plaintiff did not have a
copyright on the melody or lyrics, she alleged that her name was
identified with the song, and that she was best known by her con-
nection with it. She claimed that her rendition of the song and its
arrangement had acquired secondary meaning, and charged that
the women who appeared in the disputed advertisements imitated
her dress, mannerisms and style of delivery.5 " The plaintiff com-
plained that this imitation deceived the public by causing them to
believe that she had participated in the commercials.'5 9 Although
the defendants admitted that they had imitated the plaintiff's own
I" Id. In an earlier case, Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928), a
California court enjoined the unauthorized imitation of the plaintiff's distinctive character
creation, "Charlie Chaplin," emphasizing the concreteness given to the character through
plaintiff Chaplin's creative expression. The injunction prevented the defendant from im-
itating Chaplin in a manner that would deceive the public and work a fraud upon both the
public and Chaplin. In the court's view, the plaintiff was entitled to protection against
passing-off that would constitute unfair competition in business independent of any
trademark or tradename rights. Id. at 363, 269 P. at 546.
Like Chaplin, DeCosta created a "character," directed it into production and gave it
substance through performances. Note, supra note 48, at 563. Aside from the finding of
passing-off in Chaplin, the two causes of action are indistinguishable.
,"' The defendant's television series' gross earnings exceeded $14 million at the time
DeCosta brought his original action in the Rhode Island District Court. Comment, supra
note 134, at 1018.
'- 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
157"Id.
158 Id. at 712.
Id. The plaintiff essentially.was attempting to prove passing-off for likelihood of con-
fusion.
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style of performance,60 the court denied relief on the ground that
protection of the plaintiff's interests would clash with federal
law.' 61
Nancy Sinatra's cause of action was indistinguishable from a
direct right of publicity claim. The defendants in Sinatra invaded
the plaintiff's exclusive right to exploit and control the use of her
likeness, style and performance. These characteristics had ac-
quired pecuniary value through the plaintiff's skills and efforts,
and the defendants' imitation enhanced the sales of their product
while injuring the value of her interests. Unlike most right of
publicity claims, which involve the commercial use of the
plaintiff's name or likeness, the defendant in Sinatra appropriated
only plaintiff's singing style and rendition of a song. The distinc-
tion, however, is unimportant; the damage to the plaintiff's eco-
nomic interests in either case would be the same. 62
A federal district court reached a similar result in Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co.'6s The plaintiff, actress Shirley Booth, sued
an advertiser and its agency for damages allegedly resulting from
their commercial imitation of the voice she had used as a star of
the popular television comedy series, "Hazel." The court rejected
plaintiff's unfair competition count on the basis of the emphasis
in Sears and Compco on the federal policy of allowing free access
to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in
the public domain.'6 The court cited Sinatra and DeCosta to sup-
port its conclusion that the defendant's imitation of the plaintiff's
voice, without more, did not constitute unfair competition.6 '
160 Note, supra note 48, at 565.
11 435 F.2d at 715-18. The court found that the public had not been misled into think-
ing that the commercials were the product of plaintiff's skills and efforts. Citing the Sears
and Compco cases, the court noted that imitation alone did not justify relief. Id. at 717. The
court feared that a proposed licensee might become discouraged if he had to "pay each
artist who has played or sung the composition and who might therefore claim unfair
competition-performer's protection ... " Id. at 718.
162 Recognized legal distinctions exist between copying, imitation and appropriation. For
example, Nifnmer has emphasized the Supreme Court's finding that the defendants liable
in INS and Goldstein had gone beyond copying and had taken more than the plaintiffs'
specific products. Appropriation may arise because of improvement and refinement in the
means of copying. I M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01(b)(1), at 1-17 to 1-19. One court
has noted that "[i]n the setting of contemporary business practices, there is a critical, albeit
fine, line separating commercial parroting from pirating." Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 NJ. Super. 368, 377, 341 A.2d 348, 353 (1975). The
distinction, however, is usually economically insignificant to plaintiffs and arguably should
not affect their rights to recovery.
163 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
114 Id. at 347.
1 Id. at 345-47.
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In support of her unfair competition claim, the plaintiff had
alleged that the defendants infringed her right of publicity.' 6
Although the commercials did not use her name and likeness or
in any way identify her as the source of the voice, 6 7 the defend-
ants conceded that they intended the voice in the advertisement
to sound like the plaintiff. 8 A substantial portion of the televi-
sion audience, moreover, probably thought that the person speak-
ing in the advertisement was the plaintiff or at least the same
person who played and developed the character "Hazel" in that
television series.
69
Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff's right of pub-
licity theory failed because she was unable to show that the
defendants actually used her name or likeness.7M The court re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that performers have a protected
property right in their performances 17' that could be protected
from direct and indirect misappropriation. '7  The court's discus-
sion of the right of publicity claim was cursory, but suggests that
the plaintiff's cause of action would have been preempted even if
the defendants had actually used Booth's likeness.
C. Preemption of the Right of Publicity Before 1978
Many courts have not confronted directly the possible
preemption of the right of publicity. For example, no right of
publicity claim was asserted in either the Sinatra or DeCosta
cases. 73  In Booth, the defendants' conduct did not infringe the
'6 Id. at 347.
167 Id.
'6 Id. at 345.
169 See Note, supra note 48, at 563-64.
170 362 F. Supp. at 348-49.
'7' Id. at 345.
172 Id. at 345-47. As additional support for her claim of unfair competition, the plaintiff
alleged that the voice she used in playing the part of "Hazel" was so closely connected with
the Hazel television series that her voice had acquired a secondary meaning, and that
defendants had attempted to deceive the public into thinking that she personally endorsed
defendant's product. Id. at 348. The court, however, rejected this theory because she did
not show that her voice functioned as a trademark or tradename, or that she had ever
marketed it to promote any product or service in competition with defendant's product. Id.
at 349. Furthermore, the court believed that the federal policy (reaffirmed in Sears and
Compco) permitting imitation should prevail over the plaintiff's interest in protecting the
secondary meaning in her voice. Id. at 347-48. The court's partial reliance on preemption
grounds in dismissing this unfair competition theory suggests that federal preemption by
the 1976 Copyright Act would similarly have refuted, in the court's view, her right of
publicity arguments.
'" See notes 132-54, 156-61 and accompanying text supra. See also Davis v. Trans-World
Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969). In this case, as in Sinatra, the court held that
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plaintiff's right of publicity because the disputed commercials
used the plaintiff's interests anonymously.'74 However, the in-
terests that these courts held unprotectible are almost indistin-
guishable from those protected in Price v. Hal Roach Studios,'15 in
which a district court held that the federal copyright law did not
preempt the right of publicity.'76
Hal Roach involved a dispute over the ownership of the com-
mercial rights in the names and likenesses of Laurel and Hardy.
Plaintiffs were the comedians' widows who were sole beneficiaries
of the deceased comedians' estates, and an entrepreneur who had
been granted the exclusive right to use and merchandise in per-
petuity the names, likenesses, characters, and characterizations of
Laurel and Hardy.'77 The defendants purported to hold the ex-
clusive world-wide merchandising rights to the deceased come-
dians' names and likenesses. The plaintiffs asserted that the de-
fendants were not entitled to merchandising rights because the
defendants' asserted control conflicted with plaintiffs' exclusive
commercial rights. They alleged, in essence, that the defendants
had wrongfully appropriated rights of publicity in the characters
of Laurel and Hardy.7
The defendants contended that they were not precluded
from using the disputed names and likenesses. They argued that
the interests were in the public domain, "either because plaintiffs
never had any exclusive right to their commercial use" or "be-
cause they waived whatever rights they had." '79 They also argued
that "articles not protected by federal law from [imitation] are not
otherwise protectible" under a state right of publicity because this
right is preempted by the federal copyright laws.'
The court concluded that during their lifetimes Laurel and
Hardy clearly had property rights in their names and likenesses,' 8'
that these publicity rights survived their deaths,'82 and that there
the defendants had not committed the tort of passing-off where singers in their television
commercial anonymously copied part of a song popularized by plaintiff's singing group,
the "Fifth Dimension."
14 See Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979).
115 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 53-55.
176 400 F. Supp. at 846.
77 Id. at 838 & n.2.
178 Id. at 839.
179 Id.
'10 Id. at 843-46.
181 Id. at 844.
182 Id. at 844-45.
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was no evidence of any action constituting a waiver. 3 Further,
the court held that federal copyright laws did not preempt the
right of publicity. Quoting Goldstein v. California,8 4 the court ob-
served:
[W]here Congress determines that neither federal protection
nor freedom from restraint is required by the national interest,
it is at liberty to stay its hand entirely. Since state regulation
would not then conflict with federal action, total relinquishment
of the States' power to grant copyright protection cannot be
inferred. I85
Without further analysis, the court stated that this conclusion logi-
cally foreclosed any argument that federal laws preempt state pro-
tection in forms other than copyright laws.16
Although the Hal Roach court held that state protection of
the right of publicity did not conflict with federal protection of
similar interests, it did not compare rights protected by the pub-
licity doctrine with rights within the scope of the copyright law,
nor did it analyze their respective objectives and available
remedies.' 7 Indeed, the court's holding conflicts with the
DeCosta, Sinatra and Booth decisions, which based denials of state
law protection of analogous publicity interests in part upon the
preemption doctrine.'
The logic of these cases supports a contrary result in Hal
Roach.'89 Nevertheless, the summary conclusion in Hal Roach sub-
sequently received support in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcast-
ing Co.,'9" in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of
publicity and indicated that a right of publicity claim is not
"I Id. at 846-47.
184 412 U.S. 546 (1972) (discussed at notes 103-08 and accompanying text supra).
15 400 F. Supp. at 846 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1972)). The
defendants in Hal Roach cited the Goldstein, Sears, and Compco decisions for the proposition
that "articles not protected by federal law from limitation [sic] are not otherwise protecti-
ble." Id. at 846.
,88 400 F. Supp. at 846.
187 The Supreme Court had stated expressly in Goldstein that federal power to regulate
copyright was nonexclusive. 412 U.S. at 569-70.
,88 See Laff & Saret, supra note 67, at 55 & n.84.
189 In Hal Roach the court distinguished the Booth case by emphasizing that the former
involved anonymous commercials that did not use plaintiff's name or likeness to identify
her as the source of the voice. 400 F. Supp. at 845. The court also said that "[t]here are
many such cases where a claim is too abstract to be a protectible right or thought to be
mere imitation which is not protectible." Id. at 845. Worldvision, in contrast, enjoined the
imitation of the Laurel and Hardy characters.
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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preempted by federal law.19' The Court emphasized that protect-
ing the right of publicity provides "an economic incentive for [the
performer] to make the investment required to produce a per-
formance of interest to the public." 192 Federal patent and copy-
right laws, the Court said, share this purpose 193 because they are
"intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" that will
encourage the production of publicly beneficial works. 94 Recog-
nizing this equivalence of objectives, the Court concluded that the
Constitution does not prevent states from similarly protecting an
entertainer's interests in the value of his performance in order to
encourage beneficial productivity. 9
Allowing states to protect performers and their acts is
consistent with permitting states to enact copyright and patent
protection for forms of intellectual property unprotected by
federal law. 96 However, although the question of federal
preemption of state copyright and patent legislation was squarely
before the Court in the Goldstein and Kewanee cases, the Court in
Zacchini did not directly consider federal statutory preemption of
state-created right of publicity protection 97 Furthermore, the
Zacchini case concerned only one of the many interests that the
I d. at 577. Apparently, the defendant did not assert a preemption defense to the
state law claim in the case. At least the briefs did not address the issue. Nevertheless, the
Zacchini decision has been viewed as part of the trend to distinguish the strong emphasis
on overriding federal policies evident in Sears and Compco. See Diamond, supra note 74, at
211 n.44.
9 433 U.S. at 576.
193 Id.
4 Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
195 433 U.S. at 577 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) and Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
"9 Note, supra note 9, at 1215 n.86. In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp.
1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court upheld the plaintiff's assertion of rights of publicity. The
court's holding derived from its observation that the Supreme Court's Goldstein and
Kewanee decisions, as interpreted in Zacchini, do not preclude state protection of this form
of intellectual property that is unprotected by federal law. Id. at 1100. The defendants,
however, argued that federal copyright protection provided in the 1976 Copyright Act
preempted not only state protection of copyright, but the common law right of publicity as
well. Id. at 1096-97. The court reaffirmed its prior rejection of preemption arguments in
holding that the right of publicity in issue had survived the death of its owner and creator.
Id. at 1093. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
'91 See Note, supra note 9, at 1215. At issue in Zacchini was whether the first amendment
rendered the appropriation of an entire performance privileged because it had been pre-
sented as news. The Court granted certiorari "to consider an issue unresolved by [the]
Court: whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from dam-
ages for its alleged infringement of petitioner's state-law 'right of publicity.'" 433 U.S. at
565. The Court expressly declined to decide more than the narrow issue before it. Id. at
579 (Powell, J., dissenting). No first amendment claim was made in Goldstein or Kewanee.
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right of publicity comprehends-the right to control exploitation
of one's performance-and omitted discussion of the duration of
that right. Similarly, the court in Hal Roach did not analyze
whether state protection of the plaintiffs' exclusive rights to the
deceased comedians' names, likenesses, characters, and character-
izations obstructed congressional copyright law objectives.
It is uncertain whether copyright protection extends to char-
acters that are clearly developed in copyrighted materials.198 If,
however, federal copyright protection is available for such charac-
ters in some circumstances, then concurrent state protection
under the right of publicity might be preempted. In addition, the
perpetual nature of right of publicity protection is irreconcilable
with the limited duration of copyright protection. Because the Hal
Roach court did not resolve these issues, it is not clear that Gold-
stein, in which the Court held that Congress's copyright powers
are not exclusive, would permit state protection of all the interests
that the Hal Roach decision recognized under the right of
publicity."'
Although the Hal Roach and Zacchini decisions suggest that
states may protect the right of publicity, it is still not clear that all
types of publicity actions are secure from preemption challenges.
Although decided before Goldstein, the Decosta, Sinatra and Booth
decisions may undermine the validity of many right of publicity
actions. Nevertheless, the restrictive preemption analyses in Hal
Roach and Zacchini appear inappropriate for publicity rights when
publicity doctrine and copyright are distinguished with respect to
'98 Compare Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (cartoon
characters in books and comic strips copyrightable), with Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967) (television producers not liable to originator of
early west character in absence of copyright for character's calling cards) and Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) (use by
author of character and character names from copyrighted mystery work in subsequent
mystery works did not constitute unfair use and competition against purchaser of rights in
copyrighted mystery work) and Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930) (playwright's copyright on property did not extend to ideas). See also notes 285-95
and accompanying text infra.
199 See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The injunc-
tion granted in Hal Roach restrained the defendant's use of the names, likenesses, charac-
ters, and characterizations of Laurel and Hardy. It prohibited the use of photographs or
other reproductions of their likenesses, and the impersonation of their likenesses through
the copying of costumes, mannerisms or voices. Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455
F. Supp. 252, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Goldstein does not expressly preclude preemption of
such broad state-law protection.
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subject matter, objectives and goals, rights and remedies, and
duration of protection. 0
III
THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 21 embodies the
most fundamental change in the copyright system "since its
inception."2 2  It creates a single system of federal protection for
all "original works of authorship," published or unpublished,
from the moment they are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.20 This provision effectively abolishes the dual charac-
ter of copyright law and expands federal preemption of common
law copyright. 4
200 The recent decision in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 1090
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), states that the right publicity is not preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act.
Because the action in the case arose in 1977, however, before the 1976 Act became effec-
tive, the court's analysis of preemption under § 301 was unnecessary. Arguably, the court
only had to address preemption through a Goldstein analysis, as in the Hal Roach and Zac-
chini cases. In any event, several preemption arguments that arose prior to the 1976 Act's
effective date remain viable under the revised federal copyright law.
201 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III
1979)). The law became effective Jan. 1, 1978, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. III 1979),
except for §§ 118, 304(b), and chapter 8, which became effective upon enactment. Act of
Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976).
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT Acr OF 1976 2:1 (1977).
20' 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979). See A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 12.
204 See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-8. Section 301 substantially
mitigates the impact of the intellectual property preemption decisions on state copyright
law. See notes 99-110 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court in the Zacchini
case had cited many of the older decisions when it compared the rationale for state protec-
tion of publicity interests with the objectives of the federal patent and copyright laws. See
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). Congress's
attempt to cover the field and preempt state law came at a time when the Supreme Court
seemed to be retreating from the emphasis it had previously placed in Sears and Compco on
federal preemption of state law. See notes 98-124 and accompanying text supra. In Goldstein
the Court noted that "[u]ntil and unless Congress takes further action with respect to
recordings . .. , the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy such as those
which occurred in the present case." 412 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added). Similarly, in
Kewanee the Court stated:
Just as the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so may the
States regulate with respect to discoveries. States may hold diverse viewpoints in
protecting intellectual property relating to invention as they do in protecting
the intellectual property relating to the subject matter of copyright. The only
limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights
they do not conflict with the operation of the laws ... passed by Congress....
416 U.S. at 479. These decisions, as well as Quick Point and Zacchini, challenge the effect of
the Sears-Compco doctrine and diminish its impact on state law. ABA SECIION OF PArENT
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1978 COMMITTEE REPowrs 126 (1978).
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Section 301(a) provides that any state law,05 whether based
on common law or statute, is subject to federal preemption if: (1)
it creates "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as speci-
fied by section 106"; 206 and (2) such rights under state law may be
claimed in "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright .... ,, 207 Thus, the two criteria for state law preemption
concern the nature of the rights themselves and the nature of the
work in which such rights may be claimed.218
Section 301(b) is the obverse of 301(a). It preserves rights
and remedies under state statutes or common law with respect to
"subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright ... including works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. ' 29  In addition, the 1976 law
does not annul or limit state protection of "activities violating legal
or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright .... 11210 Thus, states
may protect interests that are not equivalent to those protected by
205 Section 301(a) not only explicitly abolishes state common law copyright for literary
property, it also reflects clear congressional intent to preempt and abolish any rights under
the common law or statutes of a state that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights that
copyright owners enjoy under the new Act and that extend to works coming within the
scope of the federal copyright law. Under this section, all rights in the nature of copyright,
including legal or equitable rights, are governed exclusively by the federal copyright statute
if the work is of a kind covered by the statute. See House JUlciARY Co,iM., REPORT ON S.
22, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao.
NEws 5659, 5745-46 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
"0 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979). Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative work based upon the copyrighted works;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio-visual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
207 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979). See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 119, § 1.01[B], at
1-9 (discussing § 301 preemption).
I 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-9.
17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (Supp. III 1979).
210 Id. §§ 301(b)(1), 301(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
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copyright as well as noncopyrightable subject matter. All rights
equivalent to copyright in works within the subject matter of
copyright are now governed exclusively by federal law.211
The broad preemptive effect of the 1976 Act may undercut
the rationales of Zacchini and Hal Roach. Because the Act signifi-
cantly restricts state regulatory power over writings,1 2 it dimin-
ishes the significance of the Supreme Court's holding in Goldstein
that the Constitution does not preclude all state regulation of
copyright.213  Yet although the thrust of section 301 is clear, its
precise preemptive effect on state law is uncertain.21 4  In cases
where section 301's prohibitions apply directly, its preemptive
effects are evident. There are other areas, however, in which the
reach of federal copyright law is dubious and for which the ques-
tion of state law preemption is critical.21 , Determining the scope
of the preemption under the 1976 Act involves two inquiries: (1)
what constitutes noncopyrightable subject matter; and (2) what
rights are not equivalent to those granted under the copyright
law? 216
Noncopyrightable subject matter includes works that are not
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.217  A work is "fixed"
if it is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
21 Sections 301(a) and (b) together make it clear that the requirements for preemption
include a subject matter test and an equivalent rights test. See A. LATMAN supra note 2Q;
Comment, supra note 20, at 490. Occurrence of preemption appears to turn primarily on
the types of works involved (literary, musical etc.). Diamond supra note 74, at 206 n.10.
2'2 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-7 to 1-8.
2 1 See Katz, supra note 52, at 211.
214 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-8. Professor Nimmer doubts whether §
301 achieves the objective of using clear language to foreclose misinterpretation and avoid
vague borderlines between state and federal protection. Id. (citing H. REP., supra note 205,
at 130). The basic question remains: how much of the state statutory and common law
does the 1976 Act leave intact to develop further? See A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 64.
215 Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1112.
216 Id. See Katz, supra note 52, at 211. The conditions for preemption may be viewed as a
codification of the Goldstein decision, which indicated that categories of writings that Con-
gress has brought within the scope of the federal statute are no longer eligible for state law
protection. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B](2), at 1-19. See also notes 102-09
and accompanying text supra. "Works of authorship" are not necessarily limited to the
seven broad categories of works listed under § 102(a) because those categories are "illustra-
tive and not limitative" and do not exhaust the scope of the original works the 1976 Act is
intended to protect. H. RPp., supra note 214, at 53. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979).
The phrase was deliberately left undefined and neither the 1976 Act nor the several com-
mittee reports indicate what kind of works are completely outside the present congres-
sional intent. See H. REP., supra note 205, at 51; 1 M. NiMrMER, supra note 105, § 2.03[A], at
2-25 to 2-26. Consequently, courts are able to find copyright protection for types of works
not expressly included in § 102(a)'s enumeration. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105,
§ 2.03[A], at 2-28.
217 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1979).
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ceived . .. for a period of more than a transitory duration." 21 8
Thus, unfixed works may include extemporaneous speeches,
works communicated only through conversations or live broad-
casts, unfilmed choreography, and improvised dramatic sketches
or musical compositions that are unrecorded and unwritten. 29
Until fixed in tangible form, states may protect such works 20 even
by creating rights that are doctrinally equivalent to copyright.22'
Rights "not equivalent" to those granted under the copyright
law are rights that are infringed by more than the mere act of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display. Professor
Nimmer observes that "if other elements are required, in addition
to or instead of, the acts of reproduction ... in order to constitute
a state created cause of action, then the right does not lie 'within
the general scope of copyright,' and there is no preemption.",!"
Section 301's legislative history does not shed much light on the
meaning of this limitation. Early versions of section 301 expressly
preserved state remedies for breaches of trust and contract, inva-
sions of privacy, trespass, conversion, and deceptive trade practices
such as passing off and false representation. 22  Accompanying
committee reports, however, observed that the legislation would
preempt causes of action commonly referred to as "misappropria-
tion" actions. 224  Later drafts expanded the examples of non-
218 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979). Fixation can be "in any tangible medium of ex-
pression now known or later developed, from which [the work] can be perceived, repro-
duced or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (Supp. III 1979).
219 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979). See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 114
(1975); H. REP., supra note 205, at 131. Section 101 provides that "[a] work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is fixed for purposes of this title if a
fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."
22 See H. REP. supra note 205, at 131. The states cannot, however, protect a work within
§§ 102 and 103 that fails to achieve copyright protection because of de minimis creativity,
lack of originality, or because it is in the public domain. Id.
2 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 101[B](2)(a), at 1-21. Because it is clear that the states
retain power to protect unfixed works, it would seem that the DeCosta, Sinatra, and Booth
decisions, which cited Sears and Compco in stating that state protection of characters and
voices was preempted, require reexamination. See Comment, supra note 20, at 491. How-
ever, it is also arguable that because these interests have been fixed by photographs, films,
tapes, and records, they remain not subject to state law protection. See note 284-324 and
accompanying text infra.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at' 1-11. "If under state law the act of repro-
duction, performance, distribution of display ... will in itself infringe the state created
right, then such right is preempted." Id. In many situations there is, however, a collateral
wrong such as an invasion of privacy or a breach of trust or confidentiality.
See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 88th CONG., 2d SEss., PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 18 (Comm. Print
1964); H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
24 See, e.g., H.R. RPP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1967).
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preempted rights to include misappropriation actions that are not
equivalent to any of the rights exclusively within copyright.2 5 In
1976, the Justice Department objected to preserving misappro-
priation actions under state law, arguing that to permit such actions
would vitiate the purpose of section 301 by sanctioning the use of
a highly anticompetitive theory.226 The Justice Department
argued that the misappropriation doctrine was potentially appli-
cable whenever a person imitated a work developed at another's
expense. 27
In an effort to preserve section 301, legislators offered from
the floor of Congress an amendment"" to the pending copyright
legislation that deleted all examples of preserved state rights in-
cluding "rights against misappropriation." The proposal received
support from the Justice Department, 9 and Congress accepted
the amendment.2 0 The surrounding debate, however, obscured
the intent of Congress. Consequently, it remains unclear whether
any or all of the examples deleted from section 301(b)(3) are
available to courts seeking to construe section 301,231 and thus the
boundaries of the preemption section are blurred.32
Legislative history supports the view that Congress did not
intend section 301 to change the existing state of the law, "as it
may exist in certain States that have recognized the right of recov-
ery relating to 'misappropriation.' "233 On the other hand, the
Justice Department's original purpose in proposing the deletions
22 See, e.g., S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b)(3) (1976). Trespass and conversion were
also added to the illustrations of nonpreempted rights.
226 The Justice Department wrote two letters in 1976 objecting to the inclusion of mis-
appropriation as an example of a nonpreempted right. It characterized the INS decision as
"much criticized" and "contrary to the great weight of authority." Letter to Senator Hugh
Scott from Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (Feb. 13,
1976); Letter to Senator Robert Kastenmeier from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Legislative Affairs (July 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Letter of July 27,
1976]. The portions of both letters that protested § 301(b)(3)'s reference to misappropria-
tion are substantially identical.
17 See Letter of July 27, 1976, supra note 226. The Department also argued that copying
is often a commercial necessity that is neither unlawful nor immoral but instead promotes
competition. Id. Although the Department's 'primary objection concerned misappropriation
it also suggested deleting the other causes of action listed in § 301(b)(3) on the ground that
they similarly could be construed to negate preemption. Id.
2'8 See 122 CONG. REc. 32015 (1976).
2 See id.
0 See generally A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 67; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B],
at 1-15 to 1-16.
231 See Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1114.
212 A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 66-67.
23 122 CONG. REc. 32015 (1976) (exchange between Representatives Railsback and
Seiberling). One commentator concludes that the Senate and House Reports imply non-
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was to restrict the scope of misappropriation under state law. 34
Although the examples, other than misappropriation, may still
illustrate prototypical nonpreempted rights, section 301's preemp-
tive effect on misappropriation itself is uncertain. Misappro-
priation actions may escape preemption in cases where the
poaching does not involve works of authorship or is "not equiva-
lent" to rights under copyright.236
Because the right of publicity resembles misappropriation
and common law copyright, its status may appear similarly
uncertain. 7  Nevertheless, the Zacchini and Hal Roach cases sug-
gest that this evolving state common law right remains intact.238
The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that section 301
does not affect right of publicity claims involving conduct-such
as the invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or
confidence-that differs from copyright infringement.2 9 More-
over, characterizing an individual's name or likeness as a work of
preemption of state law misappropriation rights. See A. LArMAN, supra note 20, at 67. He
notes, however, that the reports were issued prior to the deletions from the statute. Id.
(citing S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-16 (1975); H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 131-32 (1976)).
234 A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 68; 1 M. NImER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B](1), at 1-15
to 1-16; Comment, supra note 20, at 488-89. Diamond argues that the deletion has no
substantive effect, but nevertheless may have some unascertainable significance. Diamond,
supra note 74, at 212.
2-5 A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 69. The doctrine's amorphous character compounds the
uncertainty of preemption. Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1116. See also 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 105, § 1.10[B](1), at 1-16, 1-17; Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 672, 684 & nn.1 1-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concurring with Nimmer's analysis).
226 Comment, supra note 20, at 491-93; Fetter, supra note 20, at 370; Goldstein, supra
note 62, at 1117. See, e.g., Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that a computer input format ineligible for patent
or copyright protection cannot receive permanent protection under misappropriation doc-
trine because of preemption); Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., Inc., 486 F. Supp.
22 (N.D. Ohio 1979). See also Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1116-18; 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 105, § 1.01[B](1), at 1-13 to 1-19.
227 Cf. A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 68 (misappropriation doctrine avoided by Supreme
Court in Sears and Compco). Contra, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (publicity right found not equivalent to copyright because prerequisites for
infringement different); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 849-50, 603 P.2d
425, 448, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 346-47 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). See notes 62-86 and
accompanying text supra.
22 See notes 173-99 and accompanying text supra. See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
849-50, 603 P.2d 425, 448, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 346-47 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
2"6 H. REP., supra note 205, at 132. For example, the essence of the tort of defamation
does not lie in acts of reproduction and distribution, but such acts can lead to defamation.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-12 n.46. See also notes 296-324 and accom-
panying text infra.
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authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression is
difficult.24 ° Arguably, any cause of action concerning names or
likenesses should escape preemption.241 However, statements in
the legislative history opposing preemption of publicity and pri-
vacy actions predate the floor debate surrounding the amendment
that deleted the examples of nonpreempted rights.242 It is settled
that privacy actions should be outside the preemptive reach of
section 301 because the asserted right concerns not the indi-
vidual's economic interest in his identity, but rather his self-
esteem 243 and right to be let alone.2 44  Publicity interest claims, in
contrast, concern invaded rights that involve the individual's
economic interests in his persona. 245  Right of publicity cases
generally involve no collateral wrong, such as breach of trust or
confidentiality, or invasion of privacy.2 46  This suggests that
although section 301 may have no preemptive effects on state law
privacy rights, it may limit the right of publicity.
In Zacchini, where the court upheld state law protection of
the plaintiff's interest in his live performance as a "human can-
nonball," the peculiar circumstances were not typical of right of
publicity cases generally; Zacchini is one of the few reported cases
involving rights asserted in an entire performance.2 47  The subject
matter that the court held protectible, the human cannonball act,
involved both an idea and its expression, but was not embodied
by its creator in a "fixed work." The interests, therefore, were
ineligible for statutory copyright protection 248 and would escape
240 Under § 102, a person's name or likeness would not qualify as copyrightable subject
matter. See 17"U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979).
241 See Katz, supra note 52, at 217.
242 The report containing these statements is dated September 3, 1976; the debate took
place on September 22, 1976.
243 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1890).
244 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
241 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). Contra, Katz,
supra note 52, at 217.
2146 See notes 296-324 and accompanying text infra.
247 See Note, supra note 9, at 1211. See also Man v. Warner Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). The
more typical right of publicity case involves the unauthorized commercial use of a person's
name, likeness or aspects of his persona, against which the states provide remedies to
protect the commercial value of these property interests.
248 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1978). See also Note, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1185, 1192-94 (1978).
In discussing § 102 and the "fixation" requirement, the Senate report indicates that un-
fixed works of authorship (such as an improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic
work, performance or broadcast) would continue to be subject to protection under state
common law or statutes, and would not be eligible under § 102 for federal statutory pro-
tection. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-16 (1975). Similarly, the Goldstein deci-
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preemption by section 301. In right of publicity cases where the
interest claimed is some element of a public image, such as a
name or likeness, it is arguably less likely that the interest would
be characterizable as a "fixed work." Because states are free to
protect unfixed works as noncopyrightable subject matter, courts
might hold that the 1976 Act does not preempt state protection
under the right of publicity of characters and voices like those in
the DeCosta, Sinatra, and Booth cases."'
Section 301, however, may preempt right of publicity in-
terests that involve more than an individual's interests in his name
and likeness.250  Other aspects of an individual's persona can be-
come products with substantial pecuniary value that can be
embodied in tangible media of expression like films, photographs,
posters, recordings, graphics, and assorted types of memo-
rabilia.2 5' Resulting interests may constitute "fixed works of
authorship." When value attaches to a physical rendering, public-
ity rights in the product may be subject to regulation under the
copyright clause and preemption under section 301 of the 1976
Act.252 Section 301, in short, may preempt state publicity rights if
they resemble those protected by copyright.
sion indicated that the states were free to protect subject matter not protected by copyright
absent an explicit, valid statutory command to the contrary. Section 301 of the 1976 Act
furthers this design by allowing the states to protect subject matter that, although a "writ-
ing" and protectible under the Constitution, has not been brought within the copyright
law. Unfixed works are one class of subject matter that is constitutionally eligible for federal
protection but which § 301 leaves for state regulation.
Thus, both the Goldstein analysis and § 301 permit states to protect matters excluded
by § 102(b). It is necessary to determine, however, whether state law offers protection as
rigorous as that offered under federal copyright law, and whether supplementary state
protection of copyrightable subject matter will divert investment away from copyrightable
works, in frustration of copyright objectives, toward types of created works regulated
under other, conflicting statutory systems. Goldstein, supra note 62, at 1122. Nevertheless,
a court confronting facts identical to Zacchini today might hold that § 301 does not
preempt a state law claim. ABA SEc-'Iio. ox PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW,
1978 COMMi-I'IrEE REPORTS 126-27.
... See notes 132-73 and accompanying text supra.
25 See notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra.
251 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 479 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979) (involving unauthorized manufacture and sale of Elvis Presley posters
and memorabilia); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(involving rights to the Laurel and Hardy characters fixed on film).
" Contra, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 849-50, 603 P.2d 425, 448, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 345-47 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). In Lugosi, the defendant asserted that
congressional legislation under the copyright clause preempted the right of publicity. The
majority opinion did not address this averment.
Chief Justice Bird, however, argued in dissent that the defendant's position was un-
tenable. Id. at 849-50, 603 P.2d at 448, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Justice Bird did not discuss
the preemptive effects of § 301 of the 1976 Act, but asserted that the disputed publicity
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Section 301's preemptive effect on the right of publicity de-
pends on the extent to which the right is equivalent to copyright.
This, in turn, depends on whether the subject matter protected
involves a "fixed work of authorship" and, if so, whether the con-
duct constituting the invasion of rights involves acts other than
mere reproduction, distribution, performance or display.3 Ascer-
tainment of section 301's preemptive effects, further, must take
into account the strong federal interest in promoting uniform in-
tellectual property law. 4
IV
PUBLICITY RIGHTS OVERLAPPING FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW
To determine section 301's preemptive effect on various
publicity interests, it is helpful to examine more closely the facts
values in the case did not concern physical renderings and that the right of publicity only
protects intangible proprietary interests that are not writings. Id. This author's position is
that some interests that the right protects are in fact writings.
The decision in a recent case parallels the view of Justice Bird. In Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court held that federal copyright
law does not preempt the right of publicity. Id. at 1100. Judge Tenney's analysis, which
includes discussion of preemption both before and after the effective date of the 1976
Copyright Act, more thoroughly addresses preemption and the right of publicity than
other courts have. See id. at 1095-1100.
Nevertheless, Judge Tenney's analysis seems flawed. First, his review of § 30 I's legisla-
tive history does not adequately address the ambiguity stemming from the deletions of the
examples of nonpreempted rights, see notes 221-46 and accompanying text supra, which
suggest that Congress did intend to preempt certain types of publicity actions. Second,
despite his thorough analysis of Goldstein and other preemption cases, Judge Tenney errs
in concluding that Congress in the 1976 Act left the entire scope of publicity rights un-
affected by federal copyright law. The 1976 Act does reflect an intent to preempt the state
law right in some contexts. Third, Judge Tenney fails to recognize the full range of in-
terests encompassed by the doctrine of publicity rights. See notes 40-50 and accompanying
text supra. Finally, he does not discuss the fact that publicity rights' perpetual duration in
some jurisdictions poses problems of consistency and apparent conflicts with federal intel-
lectual property policy. See notes 324-44 and accompanying text infra.
Judge Tenney's conclusion that the right of publicity is not equivalent to copyright
because an action for its infringement requires elements distinct from a copyright violation
suit is sometimes, but not always, correct. See notes 296-327 and accompanying text infra.
In addition, the element he views as unique to publicity actions-commercial exploitation
of one's name or likeness-is not required in all publicity actions and may not be required
in any such actions. See notes 327-47 and accompanying text infra.
Consequently, Judge Tenney's conclusion that the right of publicity completely
escapes preemption by federal copyright law is not completely sound. Some types of pub-
licity actions, like those in several of the Factors cases, are contrary to federal copyright law
and subject to preemption.
213 Cf. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § L.01[B], at 1-16 (legislative history unclear con-
cerning whether 1976 Copyright Act preempts state actions involving misappropriation).
2 Comment, supra note 20, at 490.
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of the major pre-1976 cases interpreting rights of publicity and
other analogous interests. These decisions suggest that state com-
mon law publicity interests in performances, likenesses, charac-
ters, and characterizations are subject to preemption by federal
copyright law.
A. Interests in Performances
If an individual's performance is fixed in a tangible medium
of expression, a court could find a basis for preemption under
the 1976 Copyright Act. 5  For example, suppose Zacchini had
transmitted his live act over closed-circuit television and simul-
taneously filmed it for a later advertising campaign. Several fac-
tors would preclude him from bringing a right of publicity action
to contest a television station's unauthorized taping and broadcast
of his act. First, Zacchini's publicity interest would involve a work
of authorship, containing an idea and its expression, that is fixed
in a tangible medium. 5  Second, the television station's actionable
conduct-taping and broadcasting his live act-would entail
nothing more than reproduction and distribution. Such conduct
infringes rights that are protected under the general scope of
copyright law."' The work itself-the cannonball act-is not a
writing, but a film of Zacchini's act, is a "'fixed' writing" which
would be entitled to copyright protection because of the broadcast
and simultaneous filming.258  Consequently, the 1976 federal
2" ABA SECTION ON PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1978 COMMNITEE
REPORTS 126-27. See also Note, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1192-94 (1978).
21 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(6) (1978). See also note 219 and accompanying text supra.
Copyright protection requires two fundamental criteria: originality, and fixation in tangible
form. The term "original works of authorship" in § 102 of the 1976 Act was purposely left
undefined. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. I1 1979). Continued use of the term "is intended
to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts" under
the old law. H. REP., supra note 205, at 51.
The "original works" standard "does not include any requirements of novelty, in-
genuity or esthetic merit." Id. Original, in reference to a copyrighted work, simply means
that the author originated the particular work. The author is entitled to copyright protec-
tion if he independently creates a work, even if the work is completely identical to some
previous work. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
Although the 1976 Act does not define "authorship" or "author," the United States Su-
preme Court defined "author" as "[h]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator;
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (quoting Worcester).
257 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3), (4) (1978). In Zacchini the Court suggested that Ohio's right
of publicity law promoted public welfare by protecting incentives for economic investment.
433 U.S. at 576. This rationale also underlies federal copyright laws.
258 The copyrightable expression would be the recording or filming of the act, not the
live act itself. I M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.08[C], at 1-51.
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Copyright Act would preempt an equivalent state law right of
publicity if the case arose today.
The decision in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,259 in
which the court extended the right of publicity to protect a pro-
fessional entertainer against imitation of his public performance,
also illustrates section 301's possible preemptive effects. The de-
fendants in Lombardo aired an advertisement that simulated the
gestures, musical beat, and choice of music that the public associ-
ated with Guy Lombardo . 6° Because the advertisement clearly
imitated the plaintiff's distinctive style of performance, the court
upheld his common law claim alleging misappropriation of his
public personality. 6'
Lombardo sought protection of rights equivalent to those en-
compassed by copyright.2 62  The actionable conduct was nothing
more than the unauthorized copying, by reproduction and dis-
tribution, of his performance-a form of expression. It is ques-
tionable whether this form of expression constituted a work of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium.23  Lombardo was more
concerned with the simulation of his distinctive, identifiable style
than with the copying of a particular live performance. He
claimed that the defendants' use of his style to promote auto-
mobile sales diluted its value for his own endorsements. These
attributes of plaintiff's publicity interests are forms of expression
less well defined than a live performance and they usually are not
fixed in a tangible medium. Thus, a right of publicity action simi-
lar to Lombardo might escape preemption.
On the other hand, the fact that Lombardo's performances
often have been filmed, recorded, and taped suggests that his
form of expression- gestures, choice of music, and manner of
conducting- arguably has been "fixed" in several different
"tangible mediums." With fixation, style may become a "writing"
qualifying for copyright protection. 64 In view of the plaintiff's
-9 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.).
Id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
261 Id., 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. Undisputed evidence in the record indicated that the defen-
dants had negotiated with the plaintiff to appear in the commercial. The negotiations
failed, but the defendants nevertheless produced the imitative commercial. See also ABA
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1978 COMMITTEE REPORTS 127.
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(i), (4) (1978). The plaintiff sought recovery for unauthorized
copying and reproduction, but his claim also involved elements of passing-off. See notes
295-324 and accompanying text infra.
' See 1 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1978). But see Note, supra note 48, at 572-73.
2- 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1978). A performer's style may become sufficiently developed to
constitute tangible writing for which protection is available. It would not be impractical to
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basic goal of recovering for the unauthorized copying of this form
of expression-a right equivalent to copyright-it is possible to
conclude that his right of publicity action is subject to preemption.
B. Interests in Likenesses
At issue in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,65 was the plaintiff's right to control the use of baseball play-
ers' photographs in connection with the sale and advertising of
bubble gum cards. The plaintiff-licensee sought to prevent in-
terference with its contractual relations with baseball players, to
maintain its acquired publicity rights, and to enjoin a third party's
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the players'
photographs. 66
This appears to be a case for preemption. A photograph is
appropriate subject matter for copyright protection 6 7 and there
was a fixation. The legislative history of section 301, however,
clouds the issue. The examples deleted from subsection 301(b)(3)
illustrated "rights and remedies that are different in nature from
the rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be
incorporate into the copyright system a procedure for registering "style" by filing a picto-
rial and narrative description in an identifiable, durable and material form. Cf. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (lst Cir. 1967).
In DeCosta, the court suggested that the constitutional scope of copyright protection
extends to any concrete describable manifestation of intellectual creation. Id. at 320. See
also Note, supra note 48, at 566-67. Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act is similarly
broad, arguably providing statutory protection for created style. Under this theory, if a
defendant deliberately appropriated publicly-identifiable style or personal traits associated
with another individual's professional endeavors, a cause of action would be available to
the individual under federal copyright law. Style that is ineffable, however, would be in-
eligible for such protection. But see notes 283-95 and accompanying text infra.
265 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See notes 8-10 and accom-
panying text supra.
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1978). Recovery in such cases traditionally depended
upon the plaintiff-licensee showing active inducement to breach. See, e.g., Sweeney v.
Smith, 167 F. 385 (C.C.E.D. Ap.), aff'd, 171 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 600
(1909); Note, supra note 6, at 1126 & n.14.
The defendant third party in Haelan had contracted through its agent with baseball
players under contract with the plaintiff. The court held that the defendant would be
liable for any resulting breach of the plaintiff's contracts. 202 F.2d at 863. The defendant
also had purchased contract rights from another party to use other players' names and
pictures, and had used additional players' names and photographs without their consent
during the term of their contracts with the plaintiff. Id. at 868. Although the inducement-
to-breach rationale did not apply to these acts, the court held that the right of publicity was
assertable. Id. at 869. See Note, supra note 6, at 1126 & n.14. The plaintiff's contracts were
more than releases of liability and any subsequent, conflicting grants to the defendant, who
had knowledge of the plaintiff's contracts, were invalid. 202 F.2d at 868-69.
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(5) (1978).
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protected under State common law or statute.""" The House Re-
port further stated:
Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to con-
tract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract;
however, to the extent that the unfair competition concept
known as "interference with contract relations" is merely the equivalent
of copyright protection, it would be preempted. 269
If the preemptive language of section 301 is read expansively,
then the 1976 Act preempts Haelen-type causes of action, based in
part on interference with contractual relations. However, ambi-
guities in the 1976 Act's legislative history,2 7 recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with preemption, contract actions and
trade secrets, 27' and limitations imposed on Sears and Compco by
the Supreme Court 272 and other courts make this conclusion
uncertain. 3  Moreover, it is difficult to characterize a likeness as
a work of authorship within the subject matter of copyright.274
Thus, the subject matter test could not be satisfied in the Haelen
case even if the photographer, as creator of the fixed works of
authorship, assigned all of his rights to the photographs of the
players to the plaintiff-advertiser. The plaintiff sought to control
the use of the players' likenesses, which were neither "writings"
m H. REP., supra note 205, at 132.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
27 See, e.g., id.
2" See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1978); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1976); A. LA'-IAN, supra note 20, at 68-69.
272 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 470 (1974); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653 (1969).
2' See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978);
National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del.
1977); Compumarketing Serv. Corp. v. Business Envelope Mfrs., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 776
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Tape Indus. Ass'n v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1972); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc.,
64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975). See also Zim v.
Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978).
In Zim, the defendant published a book and used the plaintiff's name on the book's
spine without his approval. Id. at 1326. This conduct constituted breach of an agreement
as well as a tortious use of the author's name under state law. The plaintiff's causes of
action, which were analogous to a right of publicity action against the unauthorized use of
the plaintiff's name, accrued before the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act. The
court, accordingly, never considered the preemptive effects of § 301. The actions, however,
do not appear to be preempted by the 1976 Act because a person's name is not a "writing"
within the meaning of the statute.
"' Equating an individual's relationship to his likeness with that of an author to his work
arguably over-broadens the definition of "original works of authorship." Nevertheless, the
character likenesses of some actors and comedians might reasonably be classified as "works
of authorship."
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nor "works of authorship," not to protect the copyrighted photo-
graphs themselves. His right to control the use of these likenesses
was susceptible to infringement either by reproduction of the
photographs themselves, a copyright infringement, or by the dis-
tribution of completely different photographs. Fixation of the
likenesses would not be a prerequisite for relief.2 75
Two recent decisions involving the manufacture and sale of
iron-on transfers and imprinted T-shirts, however, illustrate the
possible overlap of publicity rights with copyright when the pro-
tected interest is a likeness. In Spelling-Goldberg Productions v.
Schneider,2 76 the defendants, without authorization, manufactured
iron-on transfers depicting the marks of the television shows
"Starsky & Hutch" and "Charlie's Angels." The court held them
liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition.2 77  The
court also held that the use of the television stars' likenesses on
the transfers infringed their publicity rights, which had been
assigned to the plaintiff Spelling-Goldberg. Under the 1976 Act
this type of right of publicity claim might be preempted because
the protected likenesses are embodied in copyrightable iron-on
transfers and because the actionable conduct involves no more
than the reproduction and distribution of these "artistic" works.
The right to control reproduction and distribution of such works
is equivalent to rights encompassed by section 106.278
27' For example, in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the plaintiff,
a former heavyweight boxing champion, received preliminary injunctive relief against the
unauthorized publication and distribution of an objectionable portrait of him in the defen-
dant's magazine. Id. at 732. Prior photographs of Ali had fixed his likeness in a tangible
medium of expression. Therefore, the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of his
photographed likeness arguably involved "equivalent rights" and "copyrightable subject
matter." Nevertheless, a celebrity like Ali who seeks relief against the unauthorized use of
his likeness is not asserting interests in a "writing," which is prerequisite for federal copy-
right protection.
A celebrity's publicity interest in his likeness can be infringed through its use in such
media as photographs, film and paintings. Whether the offending use of his likeness copies
an existing tangible representation of his visage is irrelevant. A cause of action arguably
should exist for him regardless of whether he has permitted others to photograph his
likeness and reduce it to a tangible medium of expression. The pecuniary values associated
with the use of his likeness may derive chiefly from his personal efforts. These values are
not confined to any particular fixation of his likeness (a "writing"). Rather, the pecuniary
value is inseparable from his likeness itself. Protection of his interests, therefore, should
not require technical adherence to the copyright act's "fixation" requirement. Despite its
overlap with federal copyright law, the publicity doctrine should be applicable in such cases to
provide appropriate protection.
276 450 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J., A-18 (D.N.J. 1979).
277 Id.
17' The imprints or transfers constituted graphic artwork copyrightable under § 102. See
17 U.S.C. § 102(5) (1978). Similarly, a copyright owner's bundle of rights under § 106
encompasses the rights indicated in this action. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1978).
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Supporting this view is the decision in Aucoin Management,
Inc. v. Neil's Fads, Inc.27 ' The plaintiff, who owned copyrights
associated with the rock-and-roll group "KISS," charged the
defendants, wholesalers and retailers of iron-on transfers and
imprinted T-shirts, with infringement. The court granted a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining defendants from selling "unautho-
rized merchandise using plaintiff's copyrighted graphic artwork,
including the 'KISS' characters."280  The distinction between this
result, achieved under the copyright law, and the result in Spell-
ing-Goldberg, based in part on infringement of the right of public-
ity, is insignificant.28 ' Even a narrow reading of section 301
appears to mandate preemption of right of publicity claims like
that in Spelling-Goldberg.22
C. Interests in Characters and Characterizations
The assertion of right of publicity interests in characters and
characterizations creates another potential overlap between right
27. 450 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J., A-18 (D. Mich. 1979) (awarding
plaintiff attorney's fees arising from defendant's defiance of preliminary injunction).
280 Id.
281 With respect to qualifying as a work of authorship, the marketable likeness of an
individual as himself is different from the individual's likeness as a character created by
him or another person.
For example, the likeness of a player on a baseball card is nothing more than the
player himself, who has become famous for his ability as a baseball player. The individual's
efforts were directed at developing his sporting talents, not a persona. There is no work of
authorship. However, the likeness of a singer from a rock group is considerably different
because members of the group have created fanciful, distinctive characters that are works'
of authorship. The character types are capable of description and are reducible to tangible
media of expression.
The circumstances in Spelling-Goldberg fell between these two examples. In some set-
tings, the likeness of Farah Fawcett is one of "Charlie's Angels," yet in another setting that
likeness is Farah Fawcett separate and apart from the "Angels." The former, but not the
latter, is arguably a work of authorship.
282 A publicity claim like that in Spelling-Goldberg might escape preemption because it is
analogous to a trademark infringement action and unfair-competition or passing-off claim.
The performers' likenesses in the case were analogous to trademarks used by the plaintiff
in connection with the sale of goods and services. The defendants' use of the likenesses
enabled them to pass-off their goods as those of the plaintiff, which was likely to cause
confusion in the marketplace.
Section 301(d) of the 1976 Act expressly insulates rights and remedies provided under
other federal statutes from preemption. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1976). This exclusion ap-
plies, inter alia, to the Lanham Act's provisions for trademark protection and false repre-
sentation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1051-1127 (1976); A. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 65. In
addition, the 1976 Act's legislative history suggests that Congress may not have intended §
301 to preempt state common law protection against activities like passing-off, even where
the subject matter involved comes within the scope of copyrightable subject matter. See H.
REP., supra note 205, at 132. See also notes 294-327 and accompanying text infra.
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of publicity doctrine and federal copyright law.28 Section 102 of
the 1976 Act does not clarify whether copyright protection is
available for characters per se.284 State courts, repeating the
familiar maxim of INS that no person should be permitted to pass
off as his own the thoughts and works of another, have protected
characters where the public identifies the character with the work
of a particular author.85
Many actors have created on the stage and screen distinctive
characters, expressed by identifiable and concrete styles of dress,
21 Application of the accepted distinction between "ideas" and "expressions" (see note
370-94 and accompanying text infra) is difficult for determining whether an author's char-
acter creation is a "stock" character that is available for free public use, or an intellectual
creation entitled to protection as property. Through dramatic expression by voice, manner-
isms and dress, a performer can change a created character from an unprotectible idea to
a protectible expression of that idea. He can create a style expressing the character idea in
definable terms. With sufficient development, the performer's unique personal style in
playing the character could exist independent of the character/idea and become a protecti-
ble expression. Thus, although the performer normally would have no monopolistic con-
trol over the general character concept and performance role, he would have a personal
proprietary interest in his own particular expression of that character concept.
In some circumstances, the performer may become so identified with the character/
idea that he is the character/idea itself in the public's mind. For example, the public inex-
tricably associated Bela Lugosi's performance expressions with the Dracula idea, and the
performance expressions of Laurel and Hardy with the Laurel and Hardy character/idea.
When such identification occurs, it is difficult to conclude that the style of expression exists
independent of the character/idea. See generally Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978); Note, supra note 48, at 569-72.
.. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 595
(2d ed. 1979). The issue of providing copyright protection of characters per se has arisen
in the context of sequels. A character made popular in a copyrighted play or novel is
sometimes used by another author in an independent work. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 971 (1955). Literary characters have received copyright protection from use in
sequels when they are found to be "well developed" and "individualized." See, e.g., Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931);
Burns v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 75 F. Supp. 986 (D. Mass. 1948). Cartoon
characters recceived similar protection. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978).
One commentator has suggested that "[a] sensible dividing line on the sliding scale
between a well-defined character and the stock figure is the ability of the reader to dis-
cover more about the character than, for example, his name." Parish, Statutory Copyright Protec-
tion for Fictional Characters, 8 IDEA 455, 457 (1964) (footnote omitted), See also Comment,
supra note 134, at 1021-24. But seeWarner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) ("It is conceivable that the character really consti-
tutes the story being told, but if the character is only the chessman in the game of telling
the story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the copyright.").
2' E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 284, at 595. See Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414,
132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921) (enjoining use of term "Mutt and Jeff' and
publication of cartoon imitating Mutt and Jeff cartoon series). See also Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 844-47, 603 P.2d 425, 444-46, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 342-44 (1979)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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posture, and mannerisms that the public associates with them. In
Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc.,286 the widows of comedians
Oliver Hardy and Stanley Laurel, and a third party, who pos-
sessed the exclusive rights to use and merchandise the names,
likenesses, characters, and characterizations of Laurel and Hardy,
sought to enjoin the production and distribution of a television
series entitled "Stan 'n Ollie," in which two actors portrayed the
Laurel and Hardy characters."7 The court granted the injunc-
tion, reasoning that Laurel and Hardy possessed a property right
of publicity which survived their deaths and which, by descent
and assignment, belonged to the plaintiffs.28 Here, as in the Hal
Roach decision,8 9 the defendants were restrained from using the
Laurel and Hardy names, likenesses, characters, and characteriza-
tions,
(including, without limitation, use of their photographs or
other reproductions of their physical likenesses, the impersonation
of their physical likenesses or appearances, costumes and mannerisms,
andlor the simulation of their voices) for advertising or commercial
purposes, including their use in or in connection with publica-
tions, recordings, clothing, toys, games, foods, or other product
or service, merchandising, or other product or service endorse-
ments, or in the production of animated cartoons or motion
pictures .... 280
The conduct enjoined was the reproduction or copying of
distinctive characters and styles. The invasion of the right of pub-
licity arose solely from the acts of reproduction and distribution,
which constitute rights "within the general scope of copyright."2 9'
The preemption inquiry in this context hinges on whether distinc-
tive styles and characterizations are copyrightable subject matter.
State law protection of characters and characterizations, however, is not always avail-
able, and reconciliation of federal decisions on the matter is difficult. See notes 125-91 and
accompanying text supra. Compare DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 377 F.2d
315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1007 (1968) and Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,
362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), with Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst Cir.
1962) (upholding well-known actor's claim against unauthorized voice imitation) and Cha-
plin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928) (enjoining imitator of Charlie Chaplin
character from distributing film or creating public perception that Chaplin acted in his
productions). See generally Note, supra note 48.
28 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"8 Id. at 253-54.
28 Id. at 256-58.
"' Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See notes 175-89
and accompanying text supra.
' 455 F. Supp. at 256 (emphasis in original) (quoting injunction issued in Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
1' 17 U.S.C. §§ 100, 106, 301(a) (1978).
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If a performer's style and character creation are viewed as
the oral and visual expressions of ideas, then style and character,
when developed to the point of being definable in terms of dis-
tinctive dress, mannerisms, and vocal characteristics, arguably con-
stitute "writings." 2912  The performer's expressions of character
and style are works of authorship because they result from the
performer's own intellectual labors. Individuals who have created
characters with their own gestures, styles, mannerisms, timing, and
type of vocal delivery, like Laurel and Hardy, have developed
unique artistic expressions.9 3 Although a performer's character
of style is not tangible, his performances can become "works of
authorship" fixed by means of films and tapes. 4  Consequently,
the 1976 Act appears to preempt right of publicity actions like
those in the Hal Roach and Worldvision cases. 5
V
PUBLICITY RIGHTS GENERALLY SUBJECT TO
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that
only state laws that create "legal or equitable rights ... equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right" are subject to federal preemption .2  A leading authority
on copyright law has stated:
If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, dis-
tribution or display ... will in itself infringe the state created
right, then such right is preempted. But if other elements are
required, in addition to or! instead of, the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution I or display, in order to constitute a
state created cause of action, then the right does not lie "within
the general scope of copyright," and there is no preemption.297
Thus, to determine the scope of preemption under the 1976 Act,
it is necessary to determine whether infringement of particular
1
See note 264 supra; cf. Note, supra note 48, at 569.
21' See id. at 572.
m Thus, it would not "be impracticable to incorporate into the copyright system a pro-
cedure for registering 'characters' by filing pictorial and narrative description in an iden-
tifiable, durable, and material form." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377
F.2d 315, 320 (Ist Cir. 1967).
21 Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603
F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
"6 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979).
217 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-11.
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rights requires more than "reproduction, performance, distribu-
tion or display."
The right of publicity protects the commercial display and
exploitation of names, likenesses, activities, and personal
characteristics."' Because infringement of this right may occur
under particular circumstances upon the mere reproduction or
display of one of an individual's publicity attributes, the publicity
right in some situations lies within the general scope of copyright
and is preempted. However, an analysis of several varieties of
publicity claims indicates that interests in publicity do not always
create rights equivalent to copyright.2 9
Publicity actions resemble invasion of privacy actions against
the appropriation of names or likenesses for commercial pur-
poses.5s° This type of privacy right gave rise to the right of pub-
licity because the basic privacy cause of action did not provide
adequate protection for the person who had exploited his attri-
butes commercially."0 ' Unauthorized appropriation in such cir-
cumstances not only injures the person's right to be let alone, but
it also damages property interests having recognized economic
value.0 2 A right of publicity action seeks to vindicate both in-
terests. Accordingly, a publicity action against the unauthorized
use of the name or likeness of a person who has not energetically
exploited his persona commercially is closely akin to a privacy
action. 0 The plaintiff's privacy interests, as opposed to his eco-
nomic interests, predominate. Where it closely resembles a classic
298 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 569 (1977) (quoting Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231, 351 N.E.2d 454, 459
(1976)). See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1589.
2" See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (hold-
ing right of publicity not equivalent to copyright because plaintiff in former must demon-
strate that he commercially exploited his name or likeness during his lifetime).
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1591 & n.78.
201 See notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra.
See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
-10 Some commentators and courts have asserted that the right of publicity does not
extend to the appropriation of a person's name or likeness when that person has not
previously exploited those interests commercially. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1591 & n.78.
Contra, Nimmer, supra note 1, at 217. Nimmer states:
Probably it would be wiser not to inject any arbitrary limitation on the scope of
the right of publicity relying instead [sic] on the limitation imposed by the rule
of damages.... It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons
have achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; ... the right of pub-
licity accorded to each individual "may have much or little, or only a nominal
value," but the right should be available to everyone.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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right of privacy action,"" a right of publicity action does not fall
within the scope of copyright because the essence of the tort lies
not in the acts of reproduction and distribution,0 5 but in the in-
jury to the primary interest the plaintiff seeks to vindicate-the
right to be let alone. This! particular kind of publicity action
should not be preempted by! section 301 even though the harm-
both economic and personal- results from the reproduction of
personality attributes."' 6
Similarly, in many circumstances a viable cause of action
based on the right of publicity requires something more than just
the unauthorized reproducing, distributing, or displaying of the
plaintiff's publicity interests. A strong rationale for protecting
these interests is the prevention of fraudulent business
practices."0 7 For example, when an individual's right of publicity
is infringed by the unauthorized use of one of his distinctive attri-
butes in an advertised endorsement, he suffers economic damage
by not receiving payment for the endorsement. The resulting
dilution of his interests or his association with shoddy products
may render his future endorsements less valuable.0 ' The adver-
tisement, further,, may create the false impression that a business
relationship exists between him and the advertiser."s This unau-
thorized sponsorship or endorsement misleads the public because
it involves a false claim about the product." Thus, the advertis-
Cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (holding
unauthorized use of plaintiff's picture in insurance advertisement invasion of right of
privacy).
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § l:.01[B], at 1-13.
Analagous is a cause of action for the state right of defamation, which is not preemp-
ted. The essence of both defamation and the right of privacy, as well as rights of publicity
closely akin to the right of privacy, is not reproduction and distribution. Such acts, how-
ever, may lead to violations of any of these rights. Cf. I M. NIMMER, supra note 105, §
1.01[B], at 1013 n.49 (noting that acts of reproduction, distribution, performance or dis-
play are not the essence of invasion of privacy and defamation).
m Cf. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1600 ("[one] policy motiviating courts to grant
recovery for media portrayals is the desire to prevent fraudulent business practices.").
s"I Treece, supra note 6, at 641-48.
so9 Cf. id. at 638-41 (unauthorized advertisements using publicity interests amount to
involuntary association with product or enterprise).
-10 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1600. See, e.g., Motschetenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding false association between race-car driv-
er and advertiser's promotion of cigarette sales); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90
Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979) (finding public deceived by false impression that
famous athlete endorsed lady's shaving gel); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,
58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977) (finding public deceived under false and
misleading impression that famous entertainer was connected with defendants' automobile
sales promotions). But see Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71,
77-78 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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er's conduct damages not only the individual's economic and per-
sonal interests, but the public's interests as well.
Such a cause of action is analogous to an unfair trade prac-
tices action. Both require proof of deception, passing-off or
misrepresentation-that the defendant advertiser caused the pub-
lic to believe that the plaintiff sponsored, endorsed, or was in
some way connected with the product."' The elements of decep-
tion, misrepresentation or passing-off, essential for liability, are
unrelated to a cause of action for copyright infringement.3 1 2
Although the defendant invades plaintiff's publicity interests by
reproducing and displaying attributes of his persona, relief de-
pends upon additional proof that this conduct was deceptive or
amounted to a misrepresentation. '13  A publicity action against the
advertiser who uses one of the plaintiff's publicity attributes to
endorse or promote a product without consent should, therefore,
withstand preemption under section 301.
Publicity actions are also analogous to common law unfair
competition actions and causes of action under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.314 For example, a female entertainer's fictional
character can amount to a protectible trade symbol if over time
that character comes to symbolize the plaintiff and her act in the
'" See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P.2d 544 (1928).
312 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-12 to 1-13. See also Orth-O-Vision, Inc.
v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concurring with
Nimmer's analysis).
313 Deceptive trade practices like passing-off and false representation were among the
illustrative examples of nonpreempted rights listed in but later deleted from § 301(b)(3).
See H. REP., supra note 205, at 132; notes 222-32 and accompanying text supra. Section 301
was not originally intended to preempt common law protection of such rights even where
the involved subject matter came within the statute's scope. See H. REP., supra note 205, at
132.
The essence of the passing-off and false representation torts, unlike the publicity
rights doctrine, is not merely reproduction or distribution, but rather the resulting public
confusion or deception. For example, if a performer's name or likeness is used without his
authorization to promote the sale of a product, the public may be deceived into believing
that the person does in fact endorse that product, just as he may endorse other products.
In many jurisdictions this conduct constitutes an actionable invasion of the performer's
right of publicity. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Arguments that the 1976 Copyright Act preempts this type of right of publicity action
are weak. First, it is difficult to conceptualize the performer's name or likeness as a "fixed
work of authorship." Second, this type of state-created right of publicity is arguably not a
right "equivalent to copyright"; successful assertion of the right in this context, unlike in
copyright, implicitly requires a showing of public deception or passing-off, not just proof
of the copying of a name or the reproduction of a likeness.
M See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1978).
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public mind.31s  A defendant's unauthorized reproduction and
display or performance of this character-arguably copyrightable
subject matter 6-interferes with a plaintiff's right of publicity.
However, nothing in section 301(a) restricts any rights or rem-
edies under other federal statutes,1 7 including those under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. 8 Further, this type of publicity action
is akin to an unfair competition action, which depends upon a
showing of likelihood of confusion that is not a necessary element
in a copyright infringement case. 9 Such an action, accordingly,
does not lie within the general scope of copyright. A publicity
action in these circumstances should not be preempted.
Other publicity actions, on the other hand, do not seem to
require any showing of passing-off, deception, misrepresentation
or other collateral harm, other than showing that a publicity attri-
bute was reproduced, distributed, performed or displayed. 2 ° In
Zacchini, for example, the plaintiff only had to show, to state a
valid claim, that the defendant had 'filmed his act and
subsequently showed it on the evening news. 2' In the several
Elvis Presley and Laurel and Hardy actions the actionable conduct
315 For example, one court recently stated:
[W]here the product sold by plaintiff is "entertainment" in one form or
another, then not only the advertising of the product but also an ingredient of
the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 43(a) because
the ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in the public
mind.
Protectable "ingredients" ... include the names and nicknames of enter-
tainment characters, as well as their physical appearances and costumes, but not
their physical abilities or personality traits.
D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 477 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J.,
A-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1980). See, e.g., IChaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544
(Ct. App. 1928).
S' See notes 283-95 and accompanying text supra.
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1978).
... Cf. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B], at 1-25 to 1-26 ("the current Copyright
Act does not in any manner repeal or otherwise affect other federal statutes which may in
some degree overlap [it]"). See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979).
"I9 Cf. D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 477 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT J., A-9, A-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1980) (finding no preemption of unfair com-
petition claims where state law "protects a right that is 'not equivalent' to any right granted
by the [Copyright] Act"). See also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 71, 78 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (summarily rejecting right of publicity argument where
claim alleging unfair competition found untenable). Contra, Orth-O-Vision v. Home Box
Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
"' See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Worldvision
Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979);
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"' See notes 255-58, 283 and accompanying text supra.
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involved nothing more than the unauthorized reproduction and
distribution of the deceased celebrities' likenesses and character-
izations. Defendants used these publicity interests to promote prod-
ucts, but the celebrities themselves had become the product.3 22
As a result, the public was not misled or deceived, and the plain-
tiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. Because
these celebrities were deceased, the inijuries were economic rather
than personal.2
The fact that the defendants in these cases were attempting
to reap what they had not sown by exploiting the late entertain-
ers' reputations or publicity interests, does not preclude preemp-
tion under the Act. The actionable conduct involved nothing
more than unauthorized reproduction and distribution, which
violated rights within the general scope of copyright. 4  The
argument that such publicity actions lie within the general scope
of copyright and hence are subject to federal preemption is
strong.121
22 A right of publicity action does not require a showing of deception or passing-off
where the individual himself has become a marketed product, like the late performer Elvis
Presley. Courts enjoining under the right of publicity the production and sale of Presley
memorabilia have not conditioned relief upon showing or findings of passing-off or decep-
tion. Appropriation of the good will associated with the late entertainer-the public's de-
mand for Presley mementos-alone justified relief. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.,
444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. 441 F.
Supp. 1133 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358
(1980).
Similarly, a court has enjoined, under the right of publicity, the imitation of the
Laurel and Hardy characters in a television comedy series. Price v. Worldvision Enter-
prises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979). The
plaintiffs in Worldvision did not show passing-off or deception, only the unauthorized
appropriation of the good will and creative efforts of the late comedians. Id. at 259.
In these cases, publicity interests provided adequate grounds for relief, without the
showing or finding of any collateral harm or other element different in kind from copyr-
ight infringement. But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)..
222 See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
324 Cf. I M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 1.01[B](1), at 1-17 (citing case where defendant
copied news from bulletin boards and early editions of complainant's newspapers and sold
them to his own customers).
'I The court in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
held that a plaintiff asserting the right of publicity must demonstrate that the "celebrity" or
performer who created the alleged interests commercially exploited his name and likeness
during his lifetime. Because recovery for copyright infringement does not require this
showing, the court reasoned that the right of publicity is not equivalent to copyright and
therefore escapes preemption. Id. at 1099-1100.
The court's analysis in Pro Arts, however, is unconvincing. See note 252 supra. Recov-
ery in a right of publicity action does not always require a showing of commercial exploita-
tion. See notes 320-23 and accompanying text supra. Further, a requirement that the right
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RATIONALE FOR OTHER PREEMPTIVE EFFECTS
A. The Right of Publicity: Time Duration
Although the duration of copyright is limited, 26 courts have
held the right of publicity to' be an assignable property right that
survives in perpetuity. Consequently, if section 301 of the 1976
Copyright Act does not preempt rights of publicity such as those
asserted in the characters of Laurel and Hardy in the Hal Roach
and Worldvision cases, the right will conflict with copyright law
when the copyrights on the Laurel and Hardy films expire.
3 27
When copyright on a movie film expires, for example, the
film falls into the public do main, and a retailing company may
freely use scenes from the film to advertise its products or for any
other purpose.3 28 However, this commercial use of the names,
likenesses, and other distinguishing attributes of the movie actors
is precisely the type of conduct enjoined in the Hal Roach and
Worldvision cases. 29  The arguably perpetual nature of the right
of publicity would allow the plaintiffs in Hal Roach and Worldvision
of publicity plaintiff always show status of the interest-creator as a "celebrity," or prove
"commercial exploitation," arguably imposes limitations on the publicity doctrine that are
arbitrary and not clearly definable. Assertion of publicity rights should not depend upon
"celebrity" status, but should be possible for anyone who has his persona wrongfully-
appropriated. Cf. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 217 (arguing that arbitrariness in applying test
of what constitutes "celebrity" status makes reliance on rule of damages preferable).
Adherence to contract principles for damages and equitable relief provides fair and more
easily applicable restrictions on recovery in right of publicity actions.
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. I1 1979) (copyright protection available for life of
author plus 50 years).
"' The right of publicity's purely commercial nature has led some courts to construe it
as a property right that is validly transferable and perpetual. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 479 F.2d 215, 221 (2d cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See also Hicks
v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Memphis
Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd,
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-314 (Nov. 3, 1980); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at
1618-19; Comment, supra note 37, at 1124-28; Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for
Public Figures and Celebrities, 43 BRooKLvx L. REv. 537, 541-49 (1976). Other courts,
however, have reached a conflicting result that the right of publicity survives the death of
its creator only if he commercially exploited his publicity interests during his lifetime. See,
e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc, 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980); Lugosi Iv. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552,
modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37-38 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979). See generally 503 BNA PATENTr, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHr J., at A-5
(Nov. 6, 1980) (discussing split between circuits that have addressed issue of perpetuity).
328 See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
-29 See notes 283-94 and accompanying text supra.
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to enjoin the imitation of characters like Laurel and Hardy in a
film that is in the public domain after a copyright has expired.
The appropriation would be an invasion of the plaintiffs' rights of
publicity even though copyright on the particular film was no
longer effective. Similarly, commercial exploitation of an actual
Laurel and Hardy film would be as much an invasion of their
publicity interests as the live imitation of the original actors' per-
formances, and plaintiffs would argue that the commercial use of
the film should be enjoined even though the film is in the public
domain.
This argument should fail. Permitting a publicity action
would contravene the federal policy of allowing the free use of
intellectual property that is in general circulation and not pro-
tected by a valid patent or copyright. ° These strong federal in-
terests also argue against allowing control over the imitation of
the characters and characterizations captured in that film? ' In
this instance, the right of publicity contravenes federal policy
favoring the free use of intellectual property in the public domain
to the same extent, for example, as would control of the use of a
Laurel and Hardy film with an expired copyright.332
The limited duration of copyright protection balances the in-
terest of allowing an artist or author to ulse and derive long term
benefits from intellectual creations against the competing interests
of the copyright clause and the first amendment guarantees of
free speech and press.3 s The rationale for restricting the dura-
tion of copyright protection should apply to the right of publicity
3s0 Cf. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 665, 668 (1969) (emphasizing permissibility of state
protection of property not protected by federal copyright).
" The issue of whether publicity rights are assertable in characters and characteriza-
tions captured on film and in the public domain is analogous to the question of whether
authors retain copyright interests in their created literary characters when works involving
the characters fall into the public domain. When an author has used the same well-
developed character in a series of works, and copyright protection on some but not all of
the works has expired, anyone may copy the works that are within the public domain.
However, whether the well-developed character found in both the protected and unpro-
tected works may be used by someone writing a new story is debatable. One view is that
once any work containing the character enters the public domain, anyone may use the
same character in a work that is otherwise original. See 1 M. NimMER, supra note 105, §
2.12, at 2-170.
332 See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
3ss See, e.g., Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180, 1193 (1970); Comment, supra note 37, at 1125. The
first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press...." U.S. CoNxsr. amend. I. The limited period of copyright protec-
tion balances the interest in allowing personal monopoly as an incentive for creation,
against the public's interest in maximizing the dissemination of creative works.
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as well. Permitting recovery for unauthorized appropriations of
names, likenesses and other aspects of persona restricts freedom
of speech as much as an injunction or an award of damages
would in a copyright infringement action involving works in the
public domain. 34 Offsetting this restriction on free speech, of
course, are the rationales supporting the right of publicity: re-
warding an individual for his! labors, allowing him to profit from
the publicity value of his persona, and encouraging creativity. 335
Recognition of a post-mortem right of publicity encourages
creativity and vindicates expectations of profitability.3 6 Neverthe-
less, because a perpetual right of publicity conflicts with federal
policies favoring the free use and expression of ideas, it should be
preempted.3 7
If the duration of publicity rights requires limitation to
escape constitutional preemption, courts must determine the
appropriate limits on continuity and inheritability. Courts might
do so in three ways. First, they might hold that publicity right
protection, like copyright, lasts for the life of the proprietor plus
fifty years. 8 Second, courts might recognize the right after
death of the creator only if he had assigned to an agent his right
s See Comment, supra note 37, at 1126.
s Id.; Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57, at 1129-32; Brenner, supra note 69, at 46.
M See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958-59 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-314 (Nov. 3, 1980). The court in Memphis added, however,
that making the right of publicity inheritable would not significantly inspire the creative
efforts of individuals. Id. See generally Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57.
" See, e.g., Sears & Roebuck Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1965). Protection of a
performer's persona is arguably permissible for a period of 50 years following his death.
After that "reasonable period," however, it perhaps would no longer be constitutionally
permissible to restrict the use of his likeness or name. Comment, supra note 37, at 1128.
Accord, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 447, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 345 (19.79) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Note, 29 HAsrINGs L.J. 751 (1978).
118 See Comment, supra note 37, at 1126-28; Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57, at 1131;
note 337 supra. See generally Note, 29 HAsTrINGs L.J. 751 (1978). In her dissenting opinion
in Lugosi, Justice Bird argued that
[s]ince the right of publicity recognizes an interest in intangible property similar
in many respects to creations protected by copyright law, ... that body of law is
instructive.
The Copyright Act of 1976 ... provides that a copyright in new works
shall be recognized during the author's life and for 50 years thereafter. That
period represents a reasonable evaluation of the period necessary to effect the
policies underlying the right of publicity. Therefore, I would hold that the
right of publicity should be recognized during the subject's life and for 50 years
thereafter.
25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 344-45 (1979) (citations
omitted).
726
1981] PUBLICITY PREEMPTION 727
to control it or otherwise had contracted for its use.3 9 Finally,
courts could hold that the right is either personal, like the right of
privacy, s4° or not inheritable. 4' If courts characterize the right of
publicity as inheritable, they must decide how long this property
interest should last, considering the possible conflicts between the
publicity doctrine and copyright policy, as well as rights of free
expression.12  The problems inherent in this sort of judicial line-
drawing, along with the current uncertainty about the scope and
nature of this right,43 suggest that to avoid conflicts with copy-
right law and the first amendment rights of free expression,
courts should hold that the right of publicity is not inheritable. 44
-9 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1618-19. The rationale for allowing protection
in perpetuity is that the possibility of legally providing for a person's heirs may have a
motivational effect on the person during his life. Requiring that the interest-creator ex-
ecute an assignment or contract lessens the difficulty of identifying harm from post-
mortem misuse of publicity. Id. See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215,
221-22 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Hicks v. Casablanca Records &
Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
so In Lugosi, the court stated:
If rights to the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property never exer-
cised during the lifetime of their creators were to survive their death, neither
society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the
fruits of his own labor would be served. Authority, as noted, supports the
strong policy considerations which underlie the conclusion that the right is per-
sonal.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35, 40 (1977),
aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
S41 See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
"e See, e.g., id. at 959.
14 For example, the court in Memphis stated:
Is the right of publicity taxable?.... Does the right apply to elected officials
and military heroes whose fame was gained on the public payroll, as well as to
movie stars, singers and atheletes?
Fame often is fortuitous and fleeting. It always depends on the participa-
tion of the public in the creation of an image. It usually depends on the com-
munication of information about the famous person by the media. The intangi-
ble and shifting nature of fame and celebrity status, the presence of widespread
public and press participation in its creation, the unusual psychic rewards and
income that often flow from it during life and the fact that it may be created by
bad as well as good conduct combine to create serious reservations about mak-
ing fame the permanent right of a few individuals to the exclusion of the
general public.
Id. at 959. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979).
s" In holding the publicity right uninheritable, the court in Memphis concluded: "We do
not think that whatever minimal benefit to society may result from the added motivation
and extra creativity supposedly encouraged by allowing a person to pass on his fame for
the commercial use of his heirs or assigns outweights the [countervailing]
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B. Incentive to Create and the Public Benefit
Several right of publicity decisions that involved the name
and likeness of Elvis Presley conflict with copyright law and sug-
gest another rationale for preemption. Presley had granted the
exclusive right to market his persona to his manager early in his
career and, later, to a corporation. When he died in 1977, this
company granted to Factors Etc., Inc., the exclusive right to mar-
ket the commercial Presley attributes throughout the world. 4 Fol-
lowing Presley's death a substantial market for memorabilia de-
veloped as the public demanded posters, statuettes, and other
merchandise bearing his name or likeness.46 In several suits that
challenged the marketing of Presley memorabilia by entities not
licensed by Factors, courts held that the exclusive right to exploit
the Presley name and likeness existed during his life, survived his
death, and was validly transferred. 47 Thus, courts enjoined the
sale of eight-inch pewter replicas of a Presley statue 348 and a poster
made from a copyrighted photograph of Elvis on stage during
one of his last live performances.149  One rationale for the injunc-
tions was that permitting a non-licensee to use Presley's persona
would vitiate the contract transferring control of these interests to
Factors. 5 °
Right of publicity actions like those involving the Presley per-
sona possibly are subject to preemption under section 301. Factors
considerations...." Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
-" Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
_" Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980). See also
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in
which the court noted that an issue of People magazine had depicted on its cover a variety
of Elvis Presley merchandise under the headline "Remembering Elvis/Imitators, fans &
rip-offs launch a billion dollar industry."
47 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). The Second Circuit left unde-
cided the issue of whether the right of publicity would survive the death of a celebrity if
not exploited during his life. 579 F.2d at 222 n. 11. See also Memphis Dev. Foundation v.
Factors Etc., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1323, 1327-28 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980). Other courts have noted that exploita-
tion during lifetime might be necessary for the right's perpetuity. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
-" Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330-31 (W.D.
Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
-"9 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
-10 Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'a 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
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licensed the manufacture and sale of Presley memorabilia, which
was copyrightable subject matter. The posters, photographs, and
statuettes were "works of authorship" fixed in tangible media of
expression."5 ' The conduct constituting the invasion of publicity
rights involved nothing more than the reproduction and distribu-
tion of Presley's likeness, which had been previously fixed .
3 .2
Thus, because the two elements required for preemption
existed,53 Factors should have been unable to obtain relief under
a right of publicity theory.5 4
The Factors decisions also conflict with the balance of in-
terests struck by Congress in the copyright law-to reward the
artist or author and secure "the general benefits derived by the
public from the labor of authors [and artists]." 55 Copyright pro-
tection undoubtedly encourages and rewards individuals for their
creative work. But the underlying aim of promoting this incentive
is to stimulate artistic creativity for the benefit of the general
public. 56 The right of publicity has the same ultimate goal. 57
In one Elvis Presley case, the court held that the reproduc-
tion and sale of a poster made from a copyrighted photograph of
Elvis in concert invaded publicity interests of the plaintiff, who
held "the exclusive license to exploit commercially the name and
likeness of Elvis Presley." 35  In another, Memphis Development
" See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979). Factors was marketing its own pewter statuettes
through a licensee. See Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323,
1325 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 358
(1980). A copyright infringement action against the defendant nonlicensee appears to
have been possible. Similarly, assuming that other licensees had fixed Presley's likeness in
various media of expression, it appears to have been possible for Factors to bring copyright
infringement actions against other nonlicensees.
Success in copyright infringement actions would have been dubious, however, because
proof of copying and "substantial similarity" would have been difficult. The defendants
would have insisted that their Presley poster and statutette were independent creations
based not on Factors' marketed products embodying the Presley character, but rather on
the "originial" Presley character itself. Cf.,Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ("Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the
copy.").
352 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3) (Supp. III 1979). But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding right of publicity not equivalent to
copyright because its assertion requires more than proof of reproduction and distribution).
s See notes 205-08 and accompanying text supra.
s But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
-11 See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
s5 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
_17 See notes 51-73 and accompanying text supra.
I Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979). The defendant in the case had purchased rights to a copyrighted photo-
graph of Presley from an Atlanta Journal staff photographer. Id. at 217.
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Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,5 9 the plaintiff, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, commissioned a sculptor to create a bronze Elvis Presley
statue. 6° To finance the project, the plaintiff arranged to give
eight-inch pewter replicas of the statue to persons donating
twenty-five dollars or more to the commemoration effort. 6' Both
the statue and replicas were copyrightable subject matter. 6
The injunction issued on the basis that the right of publicity
claim in the Memphis Development case prohibited the sculptor
from exercising rights that section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act
gives to copyright owners-the exclusive right to exploit works
by reproduction, distribution, and display. 363 When the artist or
author cannot publicly sell or distribute his work because his
product incorporates a name or likeness in a manner that is ac-
tionable as an invasion of some individual's right of publicity, the
incentive to create diminishes, with detrimental effects on the
general public. Similarly, companies would have little incentive to
buy from an artist the assignment of copyright in subject matter
involving publicity interests if some individual, or his estate, could
prevent commercial exploitation of the interests by asserting ex-
... 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
'o Id. at 1324.
361 Id.
$' See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (Supp. II 1979); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F.
Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding sculptured reproduction of Rodin's "Hand of
God" copyrightable); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 2.08[C], at 2-94 to 2-99. If the sculp-
tor and plaintiff had copyrighted the items, they would have had the right, in accordance
with the goals of copyright, to reap and control the benefits of their creative endeavors.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977); Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Infringement of this right would have frustrated the
copyright law's purpose of enhancing their creative motivation. In theory, this would have
proved detrimental to the public good. Cf. Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 36 (1939) (noting that purpose of Copyright Act of 1909 was to afford greater protec-
tion to literary works of lasting public benefit).
"6 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979). The injunction in Memphis Development allowed
the defendant to build the disputed memorial, but prohibited it from manufacturing, sel-
ling or distributing any statuette bearing Presley's image or likeness. See Memphis Dev.
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d
956, 957 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 SCt. 358 (1980).
Similarly, the permanent injunction that the court granted in the Pro Arts case elimi-
nated the defendant copyright purchaser's, rights to reproduce and distribute its Elvis Presley
poster. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The
court's analysis of right of publicity preemption, however, did not address the conflict
between copyright goals and the right of publicity. Rather, the court simply stated that
"[the right of publicity, firmly supported by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit,
would be severely undermined if it could be so easily circumvented by using a photograph
or representation allegedly copyrighted or within the public domain." Id. at 1100. But see
note 252 supra.
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clusive control over the commercial use of the person's name,
likeness or character. In this context the right of publicity and
copyright are incompatible. Overriding federal policy and the
supremacy clause mandate that the copyright law prevail, even
though the artist's creation-his tangible work-is the likeness or
characterization of a celebrity.364
Another conflict between the right of publicity and copyright
arises from the decisions in the Memphis Development and other
Factors cases. The copyright monopoly comports with the public
interest and the first amendment because it is of limited duration
and protects only a particular expression of an idea rather than
the idea itself."6 ' These limitations preserve the availability of the
idea to the public.3 6 The unauthorized poster of Elvis Presley in
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 367 was based upon a photograph
on which the defendant held a copyright. If the plaintiff had
owned the copyright then its monopoly would have been limited
in duration and scope. Upon expiration of the copyright, the
photograph would have entered the public domain. The court's
grant of injunction under the right of publicity, however, be-
stowed a much broader monopoly than possible under the copy-
right law. The injunction not only restrained the defendant's
exploitation of its copyrighted photograph but also gave the plain-
tiff, Factors, perpetual rights to control the reproduction and
public distribution of all representations of Elvis Presley's likeness,
including copyrighted paintings, photographs, drawings and
sculptures created and owned by others. 68  This perpetual
monopoly on any and all pictures or representations of Presley,
grounded on the right of publicity, is incompatible with the policy
underlying the federal copyright law. 69
4 State law is preempted under the supremacy clause when it obstructs the accomplish-
ment or execution of the objectives of an act of Congress. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 57 n.20 (1941). Excessive state protection in this context inhibits the artist's
incentive, which is detrimental to both the objectives of federal copyright law and the
public's interest in having access to creative works.
'5 See note 333 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-95 (1968).
'7 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
Id. at 217-18. The preliminary injunction in the Memphis Development case not only
stopped sale of the statuettes, but in addition it prevented the Foundation from using
commercially in any manner or form, the name, image, photograph or likeness of Presley.
441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330-31 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 358 (1980).
' On appeal to the Supreme Court in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., the defendant
asserted this argument against the right of publicity as one of several reasons for setting
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C. Protection of Ideas and the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity may conflict with the established prin-
ciple that ideas are not protectible . 7°  The distinction betweenI t371
ideas and expression, expressly recognized by the 1976 Act,
should also apply to the right of publicity. 72 For example, the
protectible live performance in Zacchini consisted of an idea and
its expression. As with a fixed copyrightable work, the idea of the
performance-a man being shot from a cannon-was freely
available for use by others. The Supreme Court indicated that the
defendant television station might freely stage and film its own
"human cannonball" act, 73 based on Zacchini's idea. Federal policy
and the first amendment interests support this result. 74
In copyright law, the idea/expression dichotomy is not so
much a limitation on the copyrightability of works as it is a factor
that must be considered in determining whether an unauthorized
copy infringes an original copyrighted work.373  Actionable
copying results when the d efendant substantially copies the
plaintiff's expression57 If the only similarity between two works
is an abstract idea, there is not substantial similarity, and there-
aside the injunction restraining distribution of the defendant's poster. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 16, Pro Arts, Inc. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 78-682 (1978). The Supreme
Court, however, refused to consider the issue and denied certiorari. 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
Subsequently, when the district court approved the plaintiff's request for a permanent
injunction, it did not convincingly analyze the incompatibility of federal and state policies.
See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussed at
note 252 supra).
3'70 See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 13.03[A][1], at 13-17. Affording property status
to an idea would contradict the policy of having ideas freely accessible to the public.
Copyright, therefore, allows protection for only the expression of a "work of authorship,"
not the underlying idea.
The idea/expression distinction is viewed as a requirement of the first amendment
because extending copyright protection to abstract ideas as property might constitute an
abridgement of free speech. See, e.g., Eichel v. Martin, 241 F. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
Moreover, protection of an idea as property would make it unavailable to authors, which
would reduce the arena of thought open for creative development and commercial ex-
ploitation. Such a result would obstruct the constitutional purpose of copyright law; which
is to promote "the progress of science and the useful arts." 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 105, §
13.03[A][1], at 13-17 (citing Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943)).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. III 1979).
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13
(1977).
373 Id.
371 See note 370 supra.
"5 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 105, § 2.03[D], at 2-32. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
76 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201. 217 (1954).
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fore, no infringement. 7  The distinction is nonetheless difficult
to draw. One court has commented, "Obviously, no principle can
be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and
has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably
be ad hoc." 17' Existing formulations as to when a work of au-
thorship transcends a mere idea and becomes a protectible ex-
pression are vague. Consequently, the "guiding consideration in
drawing the line is the preservation of the balance between com-
petition and protection reflected in the ... copyright laws." 3 79
Distinguishing a protectible expression of a publicity interest
from the idea upon which the persona expression is based
becomes even more difficult. For example, a name or likeness,
without more, is not copyrightable subject matter. The name or
likeness alone entails no underlying idea and does not constitute a
work of authorship.8 0 Protection of these simple publicity
interests does not contravene the policy of having ideas freely ac-
cessible to the public. A performer's right of publicity in his per-
formance, however, is more problematic. Although the defendant
in Zacchini could have staged its own human cannonball act with-
out infringing the plaintiff's right of publicity,3"' it is unclear
whether the defendant could have freely copied and filmed a
number of the other aspects of Zacchini's act. The qualities that
made the expression of the "human cannonball" idea unique were
the various accouterments of Zacchini's act.8 2 How many of
those elements warrant protection? Is the conduct actionable only
if there has been slavish copying of every aspect of the act-an
outright misappropriation?
In copyright, the "essence of infringement lies in taking not
a general theme but its particular expression through similarities
of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization." 3 The
177 See, e.g., Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943).
378 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L.
Hand, J.).
-17 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
ms See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979); Katz, supra note 52, at 217; notes 274-82 and
accompanying text supra.
"' See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577-78 n.13 (1966)
(noting that copyright law does not restrain communication of ideas or concepts).
"2 Presumably Zacchini's actual fifteen second cannon shot was preceded by some fan-
fare lasting several minutes that served to heighten audience anticipation. The dramatic
prelude to his act may have included an introduction, a description of his equipment and
of the uniqueness and danger of his stunt, a final check of the cannon, and the perfor-
mer's entry into its barrel. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
579 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976).
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requirements for copyright infringement may apply by analogy to
right of publicity claims. For example, suppose an appropriator
like the defendant in Zacchini staged its own human cannonball
act by copying the plaintiff's costume, his cannon-shot rituals, the
dress of his cannon, and the costumes and number of attendants.
He would probably infringe the plaintiff's publicity interests be-
cause these aspects of the original creator's act- his expression of
the idea-are distinctive. Reproduction of these traits invades the
creator's right of publicity in his performance. In order to be
actionable, the defendant's conduct need not amount to an out-
right misappropriation of the plaintiff's live performance.
The Lombardo case clearly illustrates an actionable copying of
protected expression. 84 In their efforts to promote retail sales of
automobiles, the defendants were unable to obtain the participa-
tion of Guy Lombardo and his orchestra in their television adver-
tisement of a special edition of car model. The promotional idea
was to have a band playing at a party celebrating both a New
Year and the new edition of the car. The defendant infringed the
plaintiff's publicity interests not by using the advertising format
itself, but rather by adopting a format that made it appear to the
viewing public that Lombardo himself and his band played at the
celebration. 85 The court's holding that this conduct created a
valid cause of action and that the appropriation of his form of
expression possibly warranted relief does not contravene the prin-
ciple that ideas alone are freely copyable . 8 6 The defendants
could have used the identical advertising format so long as the
actor conducting the band did not use the same gestures, musical
beat, and choice of music that the public associated with Guy Lom-
bardo. The plaintiff had no exclusive rights in the format itself,
but did possess rights in the particular mode of expression used
in that format, which he had developed over a period of forty
years.
Difficulty in reconciling the idea/expression dichotomy with
the scope of the right of publicity arises from the tenuous distinc-
tion between the actionable I appropriation of expression and the
nonactionable appropriation of an idea. The distinction is some-
times clear, as in Lombardo. In other circumstances, however, the
distinction is difficult. Where the publicity interest is in a charac-
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d
Dep't 1977).
" Id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
See, e.g., Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930).
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ter, characterization, or even style, the amount of "expression"
entitled to protection may be minimal.8 7 Right of publicity pro-
tection, consequently, may conflict with the basic principle that
ideas are not protected. For example, the "idea" of Laurel and
Hardy in the Hal Roach and Worldvision cases 188 involved a comedy
team consisting of two male characters. One was fat, "explosive,"
and jolly, and the other was skinny, "lovable and bumbling." 880
One played the straight man for the other's gags and jokes. Other
comedy teams have used a similar format, but the two deceased
actors had become personally identified with these characters.
They had come to personify both an idea and its expression.
Thus, the plaintiffs in the Hal Roach and Worldvision cases were
able to prevent any use, imitation or reproduction of the Laurel
and Hardy characters. 9
Another comedy team's use of the comic routines and gags
that the public associates with Laurel and Hardy could have
violated the publicity interests in the deceased comedians' charac-
ters even though the specific routines and gags may not have
been sufficiently developed and individualized to justify copyright
protection.-"' Typically, the dialogues, settings, and sequences in
comedy routines are stock scenarios, freely usable by other
comedians. 92 Thus, the proposed comedy series enjoined in
Worldvision probably would not have infringed copyrights effective
on the Laurel and Hardy movies absent verbatim copying or sub-
stantial similarity of scripts. Moreover, the test of substantial simi-
larity is one of degree and is necessarily vague.193  The right of
-"7 The idea/expression distinction, as applied to characters, implies that the more unori-
ginal the character, the more likely that it is public property as a stock character, available
for use in a wide variety of stories and entertainment contexts. Hbwever, the clarity of the
character's delineation and his importance to the original work is always a question of
degree. Comment, supra note 134, at 1022 & n.21.
m' Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603
F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
s Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
110 Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (pro-
hibiting development of television series in which actors imitated Laurel and Hardy in
typical comic situations), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); Price v. Hal Roach.Studios,
400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"I See notes 283-95 and accompanying text supra.
s1 Basic comedy team character-types are classifiable as "stock" characters and the prin-
cipal elements of a familiar comedy routine have been termed "hallowed shelf items." Use
of either typically involves no invasion of publicity rights. Cf. Comment, supra note 134, at
1033 (discussing problem of articles that are "mechanical, ... lacking in invention" and
"lacking in originality").
s' See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
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publicity, in contrast, is invaded by the imitation of characters, not
by the use of the unprotected comedy routines and formats.
Thus, the plaintiffs in Hal Roach and Worldvision were arguably
eligible for protection under the right of publicity even though a
copyright infringement action would be unavailable.
The unique contribution of Laurel and Hardy, in addition to
public domain material such as the formats of their skits and
routines, was their familiar character style and form of express-
ion. By imitating these character styles, the defendants in Hal
Roach and Worldvision appropriated a form of expression that de-
served protection. The simulation did not need to be a mirror
image of the characterizations to infringe the right of publicity.
The prospect that slavish imitation itself may be actionable
poses the risk that courts will extend protection to interests that
would otherwise fall within the prohibition against monopolized
control of pure ideas. The courts should not overbroadly construe
the right of publicity as inhering to interests which, under copy-
right law, would not be protectible because they are not fixed or,
because the interests consist lof an unprotectible idea, format or
other material in the public domain. The right of publicity must
not contravene the principle that ideas are freely usable by all.
CONCLUSION
The effects of federal intellectual property policy and section
301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 on the right of publicity is
problematic. The conduct that gives rise to a claim based on an
invasion of this right is often nothing more than the unauthorized
copying, reproduction, distribution, or display of one or more of
the several publicity interests it protects. Thus, a right of publicity
action often vindicates rights that are "equivalent" to the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright. However, these
"equivalent" rights do not necessarily inhere in "works of au-
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright." 114 Such intangible
interests as names, likenesses, distinctive styles, attributes of
personality, acts or performances, and other elements of one's
"persona" have been the bases of viable right of publicity claims.
Because these interests are not all writings or fixed works of au-
thorship, section 301 may not require preemption of some right
of publicity actions.
3- 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979).
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When one of these interests amounts to a work of authorship
and is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, however, it falls
within the subject matter of copyright. If the fixed expression is
subsequently copied, reproduced, and distributed, forceful argu-
ments support federal preemption of a state-created right of pub-
licity aimed at redressing the appropriation of interests in the
form of fixed expressions. The perpetual nature of the doctrine
strengthens the argument for preemption. Otherwise, the right of
publicity would conflict with the federal scheme of copyright and
perhaps stifle the creative efforts of some individuals.
No blanket generalizations can resolve the questions concern-
ing the continued vitality of the right of publicity. Like mis-
appropriation, some right of publicity actions may be preempted.
Others may survive either because of the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim, or because the particular right being vindicated is
not equivalent to copyright. Future defendants should assert the
federal statutory preemption defense against state right of public-
ity claims under the 1976 Copyright Act. 9 In view of the variety
of interests protected by this right, some of which can be classified
as copyrightable subject matter, and the several rights that have
been vindicated by publicity actions, the preemptive effects of
federal law on right of publicity claims must be determined on a
case by case basis.
"s See, e.g., Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
The plaintiff in Mitchell argued that the defendant had infringed copyright on the
plaintiff's book, and that the defendant had committed the tort of unfair competition by
appropriating many factual recitations contained in the plaintiff's book. Id. at 22-23. The
court rejected the plaintiff's unfair competition argument on the ground that, because the
plaintiff was asserting it to vindicate state law rights equivalent to rights protected by
copyright, it was preempted by the federal copyright laws. Id. at 25-26. See also Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming district court's
grant of summary judgment against plaintiff's unfair competition claim joined with
coyright infringement claim); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding state unfair competition claim preempted in multiple
count action).
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